[EM] Approval vs. IRV

[Brian Olson]

On Oct 12, 2004, at 8:34 PM, James Cooper wrote:

> I'm a activist in Washington state who is interested in eliminating
> the plurality system here.  We have a state-wide inititiative trying
> to get on the ballot in 2005 (http://www.irvwa.org/).  It proposes
> using IRV.  In addition, it would eliminate the general primaries in
> Washington, and just use IRV in November for all the candidates across
> the parties.
>
> I've been doing petitioning for I-318, but I've also been reading a
> variety of information on the web, and have found the arguments
> against IRV compelling.  However, most of the objections are technical
> in nature.

My objections to this initiative are legalistic in nature. Given the 
undetermined nature of what the "best" election method is, how hard 
would it be to amend this initiative in the future?

Does Washington state have an implicit rule that laws enacted by 
initiative cannot be overruled by the legislature? I didn't see any 
explicit mechanism to that effect contained in the initiative itself as 
California initiatives sometimes include.

There were a couple places in the initiative where "instant runoff 
voting" was specifically referred to where a more generic term could 
have been used. This means a broader amendment later if another method 
is to be allowed in addition or in place of IRV.

There was also a strange redundancy in the IRV definition, section 5.6.

I'd like to keep the door more open to other methods, but of course, 
fundamentally all law is fluid and changeable whenever the people so 
see fit.

If the initiative is already at a fixed state to get on the ballot as 
is, I say go with it.

[snip]

> The most compelling argument against IRV in my mind is the empirical
> evidence from Australia.  3rd party candidates are still not viable,
> and voters still vote tactically.  The requirement to rank all the
> candidates also results in some odd side effects (like 'how to vote'
> cards, and the horrific 'donkey vote').

Conveniently, 318 doesn't require full rankings.

> The most compelling argument against Approval voting from the Science
> mag article is the idea that it will result in non-substantive
> campaigns where candidates try to come across as totally inoffensive
> in order to gain approval from as many voters as possible.

I would say that an election method doesn't specifically enable 
specific campaign behavior, except that One Vote reinforces Two 
Parties. I guess I just don't believe that the "truth in advertising" 
problem of politics (boy are we seeing it here in the US these last 
couple weeks) will be much affected by a change in election method. 
Also, I _want_ the compromise candidate that makes 80% of the people 
happy.

My complaint about Approval is the vaguely unsatisfying inability to 
vote for two people but say that "I like that one better". 
Theoretically, that doesn't matter because over sufficiently many 
voters it averages out and represents their cumulative true feelings 
with reasonable accuracy.

> It strikes me that this reform will involve a lot of discussions with
> citizens about what "fairness" means in a single-winner election.

I naturally gravitate towards a Utilitarian measure of "fairness" which 
is "make the most people the happiest" or "maximize social utility". I 
based

Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/