[EM] IRV in San Francisco
Bart Ingles
bartman at netgate.net
Mon Nov 15 20:03:52 PST 2004
Eric Gorr wrote:
> At 8:16 PM -0800 11/14/04, Bart Ingles wrote:
>
>> Eric Gorr wrote:
>>
>>> At 7:44 AM -0800 11/12/04, Justin Sampson wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 12 Nov 2004, Eric Gorr wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > Well, it will cause IRV to fail the Independence of Clones
>>>> Criterion and
>>>>
>>>>> thereby be subject to a spoiler effect again.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Doesn't IRV suffer from spoiler effects anyway?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Depends.
>>>
>>> The method itself passes the ICC, so spoilers cannot come from there.
>>
>>
>> Take a hypothetical IRV variant where candidates are eliminated at
>> random, until a "majority" winner emerges. Would this method still
>> pass ICC?
>
> I cannot think of a case where random elimination of a candidate tied
> for least votes would cause IRV to fail ICC.
Actually, I wasn't thinking of ties, or of a system that would actually
be used. I was thinking in terms of how far you could distort the
method and still pass ICC. In other words, completely replace the usual
"fewest first-choice votes" elimination rule with random elimination, or
even eliminating the candidate with the most first-choice votes short of
an outright majority. As far as I can tell, such a system would pass
Mutual Majority; I just wondered if it would pass ICC.
>> If so, is the method spoiler free?
>
> Depends on whether one wants to consider spoilers in the context of IIA.
>
> There is always the possibility that spoilers can come from directions
> other then ICC and IIA.
What would be an example of a spoiler (ICC or other violation) which is
NOT an irrelevant alternative?
Bart
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list