[EM] More easily hand-counting three-slot Condorcet

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sun Nov 7 15:35:00 PST 2004

Dear Jobst,

I apologize if you feel that I haven't taken your ideas seriously.  I
haven't been reading EM very much until recently.  I will spend some
time reading past messages.

I did understand how your first proposal for measuring defeat strength
was a special case of the "grand compromise," though.

 --- Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de> a écrit : 
> Dear Kevin!
> Let us recall: you suggest to use only three slots and to interpret
> candidates in slots 1 and 2 as approved of and candidates in slot 3 as
> not approved of. Then you came up with the topic of how to measure
> defeat strength best without having to count all winning votes, and
> suggested to use approval scores. I pointed out that when using approval
> of A to measure the strength of A>B, you count some people towards that
> strength who actually prefer B to A, and that this possibility will be
>  counter-productive when trying to convince people to go voting. I
> suggested to try either the number of voters who approve of A but not of
> B (which is a special case of weighted pairwise), or at least to use the
> number of voters who don't approve of B instead of those who approve of A.
> All of this discussion was based upon the assumption that there are
> *many* candidates (not just 3) and, of course, that the voters would be
> told that slots 1 and 2 meant approval while slot 3 did not. So, your
> recent example
> 	9 A>B>C	
> 	8 B>C>A
> 	7 C>A>B
> doesn't fit into that setting at all. It only shows that it is not very
> sensitive to interpret slots 1 and 2 as approval when there's only 3
> candidates! And perhaps neither when there are more candidates...

I'm afraid I don't understand.  Having many candidates just seems to me to
be the way to minimize tallies relative to a standard pairwise matrix.

Do you mean to say that if the voters, above, are informed that the
first two ranks signify approval, that the A voters must be prepared to
see B elected despite A being the WV winner?  I certainly can appreciate
that perspective.

> It is always the same: When we restrict voters ability to express
> preferences unnecessarily (such as using only rankings or even only 3
> slots) and impose all kinds of strange assumptions (such as the one
> about approval in slots 1 and 2), we must not wonder when getting
> strange results...

I can see that perspective.  I'm currently thinking about the B>C>A
voters above, and whether there is a good way to turn C into the
winner when they vote instead BC>>A.  I'll think about this.

> PS: I think my recent "grand compromise" proposal should be a good
> common starting point for further discussion since it incorporates many
> of the important ideas we had this year. It would be nice if you could
> take it as serious as I took your proposal serious.

I will get back to you on this.

Kevin Venzke


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