[EM] James: Doesn't your method gain stronger SDSC by losing SFC & GSFC?

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed Nov 24 01:29:24 PST 2004


James:

When, with wv Condorcet, a majority ranks ranks X, but not Y, and also rank 
X1 over X, they not only ensure that Y won't win, but SFC's s guarantee and 
GSFC's guarantee also apply with respect to X1 & X:

If X1 is in the sincere Smith set, and if X is not, and if no one falsifies 
a preference, and a majority vote X1 over X, then X won't win.

Is that true with your method too, when many of the X1>X majority are rating 
X equal to X1?

The fact that they're still technically voting X1 over X now works against 
your method's compliance, because it means that the premise of conditions of 
  GSFC are met.

In fact,

If X1 is the CW, and no one falsifies a preference, and a majority 
preferring X1 to X  rank X over X1, does that guarantee that X won't win, 
even if many of the X1>X majority are rating X equal to X1?

  If not, then the price for compliance with your stronger SDSC is the 
complete loss of compliance with SFC & GSFC.

FReedom to truncate isn't worth the loss of SFC's & GSFC's guarantee that 
merely voting X1 over X, under those criteria's plausible premise 
conditoins, is enough to ensure that X won't win.

Mike Ossipoff

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