[EM] Inclusion Voting - true approval

[James Green-Armytage]

	This is an interesting idea. Debate-inclusion voting is a very
interesting problem, and I think that this is a novel approach.
>
>Traditional EM discussion focuses on elections with a fixed number of
>winners, so perhaps this is opening up a completely new category of
>election methods.

	Yes.
	If you assume that the number of winners should be fixed, then what do
you use? Well, there are lots of possibilities, but STV is one, beatpath
is another, that is, such that it produces a social ordering and takes the
top (fill in the blank) candidates in the ordering. 
	Or you might want to hybridize the two. STV serves the interest of
breadth, which is important for debate, but Condorcet is less likely to
exclude someone who might actually go on to win. So you could use both to
shore up each other's weak points. For example a version of STV that
refuses to eliminate any candidate who finishes in the top (fill in the
blank) of the beatpath ordering. This is what I would suggest, I think. 
	However, if you don't assume a fixed number of winners, then you have
significantly changed the nature of the problem.
>
>I expect there's some room for manipulation in this process. Specifically
>you might imagine the Democrats delaying their endorsement and running a
>dozen mutually supportive candidates whose combined goal is to attack the
>republican incumbent.

	Good point. Possibly devastating. The method you suggest would be very
problematic for this reason. 
	In general I guess that this is the risk you run when you don't place a
limit on the number of candidates participating. I don't know how to
resolve this; does anyone else?