[EM] equal rankings IRV
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Wed Jun 16 09:09:03 PDT 2004
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (15 June 2004):
> According to Mike, it meets his "Weak Defensive Strategy
> Criterion" (WDSC): If a majority prefers one particular
> candidate to another, then they should have a way of
> voting that will ensure that the other cannot win,
> without any member of that majority reversing a
> preference for one candidate over another.
You wrote (16 June 2004):
> Thanks for your interest and good example. Maybe somewhat
> confusingly, Steve Eppley gives two versions of this
> criterion (same name and author, but slightly different
> definitions).
>
> Here is the other one:
> > non-drastic defense: If more than half of the voters
> > prefer alternative y over alternative x, then that
> > majority must have some way of voting that ensures x
> > will not be elected and does not require any of them
> > to rank y over any more-preferred alternatives. (This
> > is promoted by Mike Ossipoff under the name Weak
> > Defensive Strategy Criterion. Non-satisfaction means
> > some members of the majority may need to misrepresent
> > their preferences by voting a compromise alternative
> > over favored alternatives if they want to ensure the
> > defeat of less-preferred alternatives.)
>
> In your example, y is A and x is E. The top three groups
> of voters, who all ranked A equal first with two other
> candidates, can ensure that E is not elected by ranking A
> alone in first place. There is no candidate that they
> prefer to A, so ER-IRV(fractional) seems to meet this
> version (as Mike Ossipoff in effect claimed).
What do you think about this example?:
10 B>C>A>E>...
10 B>D>A>E>...
10 C>B>A>E>...
10 C>D>A>E>...
10 D>B>A>E>...
10 D>C>A>E>...
7 B>E>...
7 C>E>...
7 D>E>...
38 E>...
A majority of the voters strictly prefers candidate A
to candidate E. In my opinion, this example demonstrates
that ER-IRV(fractional) violates Mike Ossipoff's WDSC and
Steve Eppley's "non-drastic defense" criterion. What do
you think?
Markus Schulze
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