[EM] equal rankings IRV

[Kevin Venzke]

Tom,

--- Tom Ruen <tomruen at itascacg.com> a écrit : > James,
> I can accept ER-IRV as an experimental method to consider, but I disapprove of the name "Equal
> Rankings IRV" ...
>  I'd most certainly prefer a
> completely different name for whole votes counted, or if not, then something like "Approval IRV"
> which to me more accurately described the hybrid counting scheme.

I think ER-IRV(whole) should not be called "Approval IRV," because Woodall uses the
name "Approval AV" to refer to what some of us call Approval-Elimination Runoff.  That's
a better method than ER-IRV(whole), anyway.

The definition is: "Repeatedly eliminate the least approved candidate until a remaining
candidate is the favorite on a majority of remaining ballots."

> I see two political arguments against approval counting:
> 
> 1. "Single vote" methods allow clear measures for candidate strengths even if there's a
> strategic betrayal of favorites that prepoll as weak and unlikely to win. When there's no
> (zero-sum) "cost" to offering extra votes, voters will offer them more as strategic protests or
> encouragements to losers, and will (if wise) withhold them to the degree they can affect the
> winner. A candidate that gets 5% of the vote in a "single vote" count have 5% of the population
> supporting them. 5% in an approval count means nothing since it comes from an unknown
> combination of "favorite choice", "pity votes", "insincere tactical votes", and general mischief
> votes. I don't know about the average candidate, but if I was running I'd not want "pity votes"
> or "protest votes" in my count. I want to know how many voters are willing to stand behind me
> alone over all others. I would gladly accept a "half-vote" by voters willing to offer me equal
> to another candidate since it represents a sacrifice.

I completely disagree with this.  It's the "single vote" methods which do not have
a clear measure of candidate strengths, since voters have strategic incentive to spend
their vote on candidates they believe to be viable.  At least in Approval, every
candidate can count on the votes of those who like the candidate best.

I don't know why you would think "pity votes," "insincere tactical votes," and "mischief
votes" would be of significant number in an Approval election.

> 2. "Single vote" methods (plurality/runoffs better) promote ideological opposites as the top two
> candidates. These two combined give a clear coverage of a single integrated "majority" and
> single "minority" position.

I don't know why you think this is a good thing...

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr



	

	
		
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