[EM] Re: A>B, B>A, A=B

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Jun 14 12:16:02 PDT 2004


Dave,

 --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit : 
> > I want this to read this way:
> > I imagine something like an A>B>C>A cycle, where **B>C** is the weakest defeat, so that
> > C is the winner.  In Winning Votes, it's possible that if equal numbers of A>B and B>A 
> > voters change their ranking to A=B, then A>B will be the weakest defeat, and **B** will be
> > elected.
> 
> I lost track of the original context, but it SHOULD have been Condorcet, 
> for which I wrote what I CLAIM should be true, NOT Kevin's different 
> assumption.

What I was doing was explaining how Winning Votes can treat A>B B>A differently from 
two copies of A=B, and trying to argue that this is defensible behavior.

> > I see.  I wasn't sure if you were still advocating a Margins/Winning Votes hybrid,
> > or if you had decided to only advocate Margins.
> 
> I get dizzy on this, but wv sounds better to me.

It sounds better to me, too.  However, since WV does not count votes to either
candidate in the case of equal ranking, the following isn't the case:

> >>>>If two voters rank 
> >>>>A=B, the effect should be the same as if one ranked A>B and the other 
> >>>>ranked B>A.

If you want this behavior then you have to use Margins.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr



	

	
		
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