[EM] Re: A>B, B>A, A=B

[Kevin Venzke]

Dave,

 --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit : 
> > Dave Ketchum wrote:
> >>If two voters rank 
> >>A=B, the effect should be the same as if one ranked A>B and the other 
> >>ranked B>A.
> > 
> > Dave didn't say anything about no votes for truncated candidates, so I guess he now
> > advocates Margins.
> > 
> I said "rank" - agreed that truncated candidates are liked less than 
> those explicitly ranked, but they get there via truncation rather than 
> ranking, and this does not demonstrate equal liking or dislike.

I see.  I wasn't sure if you were still advocating a Margins/Winning Votes hybrid,
or if you had decided to only advocate Margins.


I imagine something like an A>B>C>A cycle, where C>A is the weakest defeat, so that
C is the winner.  In Winning Votes, it's possible that if equal numbers of A>B and B>A 
voters change their ranking to A=B, then A>B will be the weakest defeat, and A will be
elected.

I think this is justifiable.  A voter ranking A=B instead of A>B is giving up the
ability to support A over B, in exchange for a greater probability of getting one
of the two elected instead of C.

If the method doesn't permit equal ranking to accomplish this, then some of the A>B
voters will wish that they had instead voted B>A, in order to turn B into a Condorcet
winner.  That seems undesirable to me.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr



	

	
		
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