[EM] Top Three Condorcet

[Dave Ketchum]

We ain't communicating, so, ENOUGH!

To anyone else reading, my claim is:
      With the Condorcet method(s), the voter ranks all candidates liked 
better than "last" (optionally including ranking "last").
      There is no other voter activity such as a rating or grading of 
candidates - methods including such activity should be required to have 
their own NON-conflicting names.

      Some of what I read implies the voter specifying a threshold, 
dividing ranks into better and worse - I do not object to ballots with 
this feature also being called Condorcet.
      END

Dave Ketchum

On Wed, 9 Jun 2004 13:58:41 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Jun 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
> 
>>On Wed, 9 Jun 2004 09:56:24 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
>>
>>
>>>On Wed, 9 Jun 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>On Tue, 8 Jun 2004 14:06:19 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>If I understand correctly, Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, MinMax, and all of the
>>>>>other serious Condorcet methods are in agreement (except for the
>>>>>margins/wv debate) when there are only three candidates: if one of them
>>>>>beats each of the others pairwise, then that candidate is the winner.
>>>>>Otherwise, the cycle is broken at the weakest link.
>>>>>
>>>>>So why not take advantage of this agreement by using some simple but
>>>>>reasonable method to eliminate all but three candidates and then among
>>>>>those three
>>>>>
>>>>>   If there is a cycle
>>>>>      Then break it at the weakest link
>>>>>      Else go with the one who beats the other two.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>Elimination methods that eliminate all the way down to two candidates
>>>>>offer too much order reversal incentive, but if there is room for three
>>>>>finalists, then that incentive may be negligible.
>>>>>
>>>>>Here's a more specific proposal along these lines:
>>>>>
>>>>>Use grade ballots.  The three finalists are A the candidate with the
>>>>>greatest number of top grades, B the candidate with the highest grade
>>>>>point average, and C the candidate with greatest number of passing grades.
>>>>>
>>>>>If all three of these turn out to be the same candidate, then this
>>>>>candidate wins.
>>>>>
>>>>>If the set {A,B,C} has only two distinct members, then whichever wins
>>>>>pairwise between them is the method winner.
>>>>>
>>>>>If all three are distinct, and one of them beats the other two pairwise,
>>>>>then that one is the winner.
>>>>>
>>>>>If there is a three way cycle, then the cycle is broken at the weakest
>>>>>link.
>>>>>
>>>>>This method is summable, easy to understand, and hard to criticize, though
>>>>>I'm sure the purists will have plenty to say :')
>>>>>
>>>>>The main disadvantages I see are (1) the controversy over margins versus
>>>>>winning votes, and (2) some folks think that it is too hard to grade the
>>>>>candidates.
>>>>>
>>>>>Any other proposals for Top Three Condorcet?
>>>>>
>>>>>Forest
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>What is a grade ballot?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>A ballot on which each candidate may be graded on some scale, e.g. A
>>>through F or (Steph's idea) A through Z.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>Anyway, a method using it should not be called Condorcet.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>Condorcet's method is used to determine the winner from among the three
>>>finalists.  As long as there are at least three grades, a ranking can be
>>>inferred from the grade ballot.  Actually the name isn't Condorcet, it is
>>>"Top Three Condorcet," a name for a class of methods, not aparticular
>>>method.
>>>
>>>If you have a more apt name, I'm willing to consider it.
>>>
>>>
>>I am not ready to try to name this creature, which I doubt deserves existence.
>>
>>Neither do I claim the muscle to be able to demand renaming, unless
>>someone else sees what I see and joins in.
>>
>>What I see as Condorcet is that it is an IMPORTANT method name, and that
>>its voting is on a ranked ballot, with NO COMPLICATIONS for the voter such
>>as rating or grading.
>>
> 
> You can get your three finalists by any method that you like, using any
> kind of ballot that you like.  But the simpler the better, because there
> are only two justifications for the existence of this class of methods:
> (1) The Condorcet step is much easier to describe than Ranked Pairs or
> SSD. (2) The winner among the three finalists is the one universally
> agreed upon by all Condorcet fans (mod the wv/margins controversy).
> 
> 
> 
>>I also see it usable in an election for governor, with the arrays of vote
>>counts being the ONLY information forwarded by precincts for central
>>summing and analysis.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>>Finally:
>>>>     If there is no cycle, what is there to brag about here?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>Depends on the way that the three finalists are chosen.
>>>
>>>
>>Again, if there is no cycle in the voters' ranking, what value would there
>>be in grading?
>>
> 
> Only if you want to use grades to determine the three finalists.
> 
> 
>>>>     If there is a three way cycle, why not solve it via Condorcet?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>That's exactly what is proposed here.
>>>
>>>
>>In context, my saying "in voters' ranking" should clarify.
>>
> 
> Are you suggesting that we check for cycles before deciding on the
> election method?
> 
> In any case, it is much easier to detect and deal with cycles after the
> field has been narrowed down to three candidates than it is with twenty or
> thirty candidates.  A novice could do it by hand in the case of three
> candidates, after a very brief explanation of three candidate Condorcet.
> 
> 
>>>>     For other cycles, are we not better off dealing with what should be
>>>>rarities by agreeing as to how to solve them via ranked ballots?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>There cannot be other cycles when there are only three finalists.
>>>
>>>
>>Same as above - point is that Condorcet has no trouble disposing of all
>>the minor candidates that are not in a cycle.  Here I claim that it should
>>be rare, indeed, to have more than three candidates strong enough to be in
>>a cycle for Condorcet without your grading.
>>
>>
> 
> My point is that it is a lot simpler to explain the Condorcet step to the
> voters when there can be only three candidates under consideration:
> 
>       If there is no cycle, then the candidate that beats both of the
> others is the winner.  If there is a cycle, break it at the weakest link.
> 
> 
> Try describing Beatpath or Ranked Pairs that simply.
> 
> 
> Forest

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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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