[EM] IMHO, IRV superior to approval

[Stephane Rouillon]

I agree with you Adam, but it leads me again to the same comment I gave Mike:

Maybe I need more mathematical support on this but, even if I agree with Mike,
I evaluate the number of time I would have to bury my favourite in order to
get it elected with IRV far less than the number of time I could lose him by not
setting
properly my approval cut-off with approval. It is a matter of odds
(probability).
Could someone evalute those, even just for a small case?

Steph

Adam Tarr a écrit :

> Just to review - this started as a discussion of 1P-1V.  I pointed out that
> the criteria seems to be based more on the way the votes are read, than the
> results.  To drive the point home, I presented a sequential way of working
> through the ballots so that both IRV and Approval eliminate candidates by
> taking two candidates, pairing them off, and eliminating one of them.
>
> Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>
> >Adam Tarr a écrit :
> >
> > > Steph wrote:
> >
> > > >If your ballot is exhausted it is because you decided not to provide a
> > > >full ranking.
> > > >It is your choice not a fact inherent to the electoral method.
> > >
> > > Approving of both or neither of the final two candidates in approval is a
> > > choice not inherent in the method, as well.
> >
> >With IRV, a voter can make sure its preference will count when only two
> >candidates are left at the last round.  With Olli's sequential equivalent
> >version of approval, voters cannot be sure they will participate in that
> >last selection because they do not know in advance who will be the last
> >contenders.
>
> True.  But as I said before, what is so special about the last
> elimination?  The vast majority of the IRV voters will NOT participate in
> every elimination round.  Each round eliminates one candidate.  Why is the
> last elimination more important?  What if your second choice is eliminated
> earlier, and you never got to participate in that contest, and now you're
> choosing between your fourth and fifth choices?
>
> >In my eye, approving of both or neither of the final two candidates in
> >approval
> >is not a choice, it's a guess. And that is inherent to approval. With
> >approval, the
> >voter needs to guess in which pairwise comparison its participation will
> >most make a difference (and puts the cut-off there).
>
> And this is analogous to the question of whether to bury your favorite to
> protect your compromise in IRV.  That, too, is a guess.  If you bury and
> guessed wrong, you end up electing the compromise you didn't need (just
> like approving an un-needed second choice).  If you don't bury and guessed
> wrong, you end up indirectly electing your least favorite (just like
> failing to approve a needed second choice).
>
> IRV does not solve this guessing game any better than approval.  In fact,
> as Mike Ossipoff has pointed out many times, approval is more forgiving to
> poor strategy in several of these cases.
>
> Only Condorcet allows you to vote sincerely without fear in this situation
> (ignoring for the moment the more remote possibility of a circular tie).
>
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