[EM] Every MMC example can just as easily be an IRV WDSC & FBC failurle examp

[James Green-Armytage]

Quoted text is Mike Ossipoff. Unquoted text (current) is me, James.

>And if we're writing the example so that it's known which 
>mutual majority candidate will win, then it's obvious that it could just
>as 
>easily be written with defensive favorite-burial incentive in IRV.

	Quite true.

>James also speaks of an example in which the "mutual" majority involves
>only 
>one candidate.
>When I've made my claim about mutual majority examples, I've always said 
>that it's known that the mutual majority exists for a certain set of 
>candidates. Knowing that gives other voters incentive to bury their 
>favorite. But if it's known that the "mutual" majority for A exists, then 
>the A voters have no reason to vote for B.

	Yes, I understand. That's why I provided the second example; I eventually
realized that the straight-up majority wasn't what you were talking about.

>Sure, given a lack of information about the majority, in Approval, some A 
>voters might feel a need to vote for B. And, likewise, with such
>incomplete 
>information, in IRV, some A voters might think that A doesn't have a 
>majority, and that B is the  best that they can get, and that they need
>to 
>help B by voting B in 1st place instead of A, because obvioulsy B doesn't 
>have much favoriteness, and needs all the help s/he can get. So the mere 
>belief that A doesn't have a majority will send A voters ranking B in 1st 
>place.
>It would seem that James wants to apply different standards to Approval
>and 
>to IRV.
>The difference? In IRV, those mistakenly compromising voters are burying 
>their favorite by voting someone over hir. But not in Approval. That's
>why 
>Approval, compared to IRV, requires twice as many mistaken compromisers
>to 
>give away an election.

	Yes, well, that's why I prefer equal-rankings IRV (whole votes). 
>
>
>They all plausibly lead to such examples. They could all just as easily
>be 
>such examples. And if the voters don't know who wins under sincere
>voting, 
>but only know about the mutal majority, then in IRV they have incentive
>to 
>bury their favorite.

	Okay, but those are reasonably heavy "if's".

>So yes, I withdraw "is" in that statement, and replace it with  "could
>just 
>as easily be".

	Okay, fair enough.

>And if it seems as if I'm moving the goalposts, my point all along was
>just 
>that the IRVers' mutual majority and clone examples bring out how easily
>IRV 
>fails WDSC & FBC, two failures that IRVers like to claim are rare. Not
>rare.
 

	Oh, don't worry, I wasn't making that claim. (And besides that, I don't
consider myself to be an IRVer anyway ; )

best,
James