[EM] Re: IMHO, IRV superior to Approval

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

True clone sets are rare in public elections, though near or effective clone 
sets can happen. Though mutual majorities, and maybe near clone sets,  
aren't unheard of, criteria about them don't have the general applicability 
of the defensive strategy criteria. That's why they can be called 
"fortuitous special case criteria".

Chris said:

I find it a bit implausible that the C voters all give their second
-preferences to B, with no recipricocity  at all.

I reply:

The suporters of the middle of 3 candidates have no reason to vote for 
anyone but hir in Approval. If someone else has majority, there's nothing 
they can do about it. If not, Middle is CW, and the extremes need Middle 
more than Middle's voters need the extremes. And everyone knows that, then, 
Middle is the rightful winner.

Chris said:

I gather
from posts in the archives, that Condorcet (Winning Votes) fails
because if voters have a sufficiently large gap in their ratings, say
between second and third place, they do better to insincerely rank
the candidates above the gap in equal-first place.

I reply:

Yes, but not if AERLO is available. And, in any case, when that incentive 
exists, because AERLO isn't available, that strategic equal ranking isn't a 
defensive strategy need. It's a mere incentive to gain in certain special 
kinds of natural circular ties. Therefore it isn't as serious as the prolems 
& failures of other methods.

In wv Condorcet, if AERLO isn't available, I'd rank all the acceptable 
candidates together in 1st place. I don't consider that a serious Condorcet 
disadvantage, because there isn't defensive strategy need to do that. No one 
needs to in order to prevent a majority rule violation or to protect the win 
of a CW. And it's better than the things that IRV & margins Condorcet will 
makek people do, giving them defensive strategic need to do so.

With AERLO, I'd draw an AERLO line below the acceptable candidates, and rank 
them all in sincere order.


Chris continued:

Also, it is true, or
has been strongly conjectured, that voters who do not have a sincere
full ranking do better to strictly rank all the candidates below
first-place .

I reply:

That can be true. But it's difficult to determine when it's true. Not that 
it's important. How bad is it if a method gives you incentive to randomly 
rank candidates whom you sincerely rate exactly equal. If they're exactly 
equal to you, then what do you care which one you use against the other, or 
which one wins? That much-argued "problem" is no problem at all.

Chris said:

I don't see why the it is particularly unlikely that the
"zero-information"  (poll-ignoring) voter wouldn't distinguish between
the two
leading candidates (not approving either or approving both).

I reply

In trying to find a bad example for Approval, it isn't reasonable to say 
that reliable information shows that there are 2 likely frontrunners, but 
someone ignores that information and votes 0-info.

Chris continued:

In my
opinion, the concientious voter shouldn't have to do anything
except calmly and rationally rank the candidates.

I reply:

So don't get upset or excited when you vote! :-)

Of course the IRV voter _does_ often have to do something other than calmly 
and ratinally ranking the candidates: S/he will often have to bury hir 
favorite, something that s/he will never have to do in Approval.

Mike Ossipoff

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