[EM] Re: Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #688 - 6 msgs

[Alex Small]

What I like most about this method is that you use 3 different criteria to
determine the 3 finalists.  This would make it much harder for a
determined faction to get its favorite, plus 2 idiots, in the finals. 
Moreover, by making it 3 finalists, getting 2 idiots into the finals is
riskier, and getting just 1 into the finals is less likely to be
effective.

This method seems to correct some of the flaws associated with
Approval-based runoffs and similar methods, where a determined faction
might get its favorite plus a sacrificial lamb into the finals.

One final observation:  We've discussed before how CR methods might, at
least in a single-election context, give strong incentives to rate all
candidates either zero points or maximum points.  The desire to get 2
candidates into the finals would give a strong incentive to give both of
them maximum points, but the desire to make a difference in the finals
would give an incentive to give them different ratings.  Admitting the
candidate with the fewest failing grades makes it somewhat safer to
differentiate between candidates.

Forest said:
> If I understand correctly, Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, MinMax, and all of
> the other serious Condorcet methods are in agreement (except for the
> margins/wv debate) when there are only three candidates: if one of them
> beats each of the others pairwise, then that candidate is the winner.
> Otherwise, the cycle is broken at the weakest link.
>
> So why not take advantage of this agreement by using some simple but
> reasonable method to eliminate all but three candidates and then among
> those three
>
>     If there is a cycle
>        Then break it at the weakest link
>        Else go with the one who beats the other two.
>
>
> Elimination methods that eliminate all the way down to two candidates
> offer too much order reversal incentive, but if there is room for three
> finalists, then that incentive may be negligible.
>
> Here's a more specific proposal along these lines:
>
> Use grade ballots.  The three finalists are A the candidate with the
> greatest number of top grades, B the candidate with the highest grade
> point average, and C the candidate with greatest number of passing
> grades.
>
> If all three of these turn out to be the same candidate, then this
> candidate wins.
>
> If the set {A,B,C} has only two distinct members, then whichever wins
> pairwise between them is the method winner.
>
> If all three are distinct, and one of them beats the other two pairwise,
> then that one is the winner.
>
> If there is a three way cycle, then the cycle is broken at the weakest
> link.
>
> This method is summable, easy to understand, and hard to criticize,
> though I'm sure the purists will have plenty to say :')
>
> The main disadvantages I see are (1) the controversy over margins versus
> winning votes, and (2) some folks think that it is too hard to grade the
> candidates.
>
> Any other proposals for Top Three Condorcet?
>
> Forest