[EM] Jargon Dictionary

[James Green-Armytage]

Jargon Dictionary for the Election Methods list
__________________________________


AERLO:

Approval voting: Voters can give each candidate a score of either 1 of 0.
The candidate with the highest cumulative score wins. JGA

ATLO:

Beatpath method:

Block voting:

Borda count:

Bucklin:

Burying strategy: Insincerely ranking a candidate lower in the hope of
defeating it. For example, if your sincere preferences are R>S>T, and you
instead voted R>T>S in order to decrease the probability of S winning.
Burying strategy can fall under the category of burying:reversal or
burying:compression. Burying:reversal would be to change R>S>T to R>T>S,
as above. Burying:compression would be to change R>S>T to R>S=T. JGA

Candidate withdrawal option (CWO): Once a vote has been taken and the
initial result tallied, there is a period of time wherein any candidate(s)
can officially withdraw from contention and order a re-tally of the votes
with their own names removed from the ballots. For example, if candidate A
chose to withdraw, then a ranked ballot which listed candidate A first and
candidate B second would list candidate B as the first choice in the
re-tally. This provision is generally intended for use with methods that
fail the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion. JGA

Cardinal ratings:

Compromising strategy: Insincerely ranking an alternative higher in the
hope of getting it elected. For example, if your sincere preferences are
R>S>T, and you instead voted S>R>T in order to increase the probability of
S winning. Compromising strategy can fall under the category of
compromising:reversal or compromising:compression. Compromising:reversal
would be to change R>S>T to S>R>T, as above. Compromising:compression
would be to change R>S>T to R=S>T. JGA

Condorcet criterion: A method that passes the Condorcet criterion is one
in which the Condorcet winner is always elected when one exists. JGA

Condorcet loser criterion: A method that passes the Condorcet loser
criterion is one in which a Condorcet loser is never elected. JGA

Condorcet winner: A candidate who wins all of their pairwise comparisons.
JGA

Condorcet loser: A candidate who loses all of their pairwise comparisons.
JGA

Coombs: 

CPO-STV:

Cumulative voting:

Direct democracy:

Droop quota:

First past the post (FPTP): See 'plurality voting'

FBC:

Independence of clones criterion: 

Independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion (IIAC): 

INI:

IRNR:

IRV: Instant runoff voting. a.k.a. AV, the alternative vote. Voters ranks
candidates in order of preference. The tally simulates a series of rounds
where each voter votes for their first choice of remaining candidate. In
each round the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, until only
one candidate remains. (The count can also be stopped if one candidate
receives the majority of the remaining vote.) IRV is the single-winner
version of STV. JGA

Hare quota:

Later-no-harm:

Later-no-help:

MCA:

Meek STV:

Minimal dominant set: In a pairwise tally, the smallest possible set of
candidates such that every candidate inside the set beats every candidate
outside of the set. Also known as the Smith set, or the GETCHA set.
Identical to the union of minimal undominated sets when there are no
pairwise ties. JGA

Mixed member proportional representation (MMP): 

Monotonicity criterion:

Mutual majority criterion:

Offensive order reversal:

Pairwise comparison: Method invented by the Marquis de Condorcet. Voters
rank candidates in order of preference. The tally simulates a series of
contests between each candidate and every other candidate, like a round
robin tournament. In a pairwise contest between two candidates, each voter
is assumed to vote for the candidate whom s/he ranks higher than the
other. If the voter ranks two candidates equally, then their vote is not
counted in the pairwise comparison between those candidates. JGA

Participation criterion:

Plurality voting: Each person votes for one and only one candidate. The
candidate who receives the most votes wins. JGA

Proportional representation:

Proportional approval voting (PAV): 

Proxy system:

QLTD:

QLWA:

Ranked pairs method: Voters submit ranked ballots and a pairwise tally is
made. Pairwise defeats are then considered in order of strength, with the
strongest defeat considered first. As each defeat is considered, it is
locked into place, unless it forms a cycle with defeats that have already
been locked into place, in which case it is dropped (disrecognized). Once
all defeats have been thus considered, the candidate who remain undefeated
is the winner. (If more than one candidate is undefeated, then it is a
tie.) Invented by Nicolaus Tideman. JGA

River method:

RMDD: 

Schwartz set: In a pairwise tally, an undominated set is a set of
candidates not beaten by any candidates outside the set. A minimal
undominated set does not contain other undominated sets. The Schwartz set
includes all of the candidates who are part of one minimal undominated set
or another. Also known as the union of minimal undominated sets, or the
GOCHA set. Identical to the Smith set when there are no pairwise ties. JGA

Schwartz sequential dropping method (SSD):

SDSC:

Single transferable vote (STV):

Smith set: In a pairwise tally, the smallest possible set of candidates
such that every candidate inside the set beats every candidate outside of
the set. Also known as the minimal dominant set, or the GETCHA set.
Identical to the Schwartz set when there are no pairwise ties. JGA

SPAA:

SSSC: 

Two round runoff: People vote for one and only one candidate. If any
candidate receives the majority of the vote, they win. If no candidate
receives a majority, a runoff election is held between the two candidates
who received the most votes in the first round. People can vote for one
and only one of the candidates in the runoff. The candidate with the most
votes in the runoff wins.
	Variation: Any candidate who receives more than a certain percentage of
the vote in the first round (e.g. 12.5%) is eligible to participate in the
second round. JGA

Union of minimal undominated sets: In a pairwise tally, an undominated set
is a set of candidates not beaten by any candidates outside the set. A
minimal undominated set does not contain other undominated sets. The union
of minimal undominated sets includes all of the candidates who are part of
one minimal undominated set or another. Also known as the Schwartz set, or
the GOCHA set. Identical to the minimal dominant set when there are no
pairwise ties. JGA

WDSC:


____________________________________________


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recent version of the dictionary.

Key to initials (in alphabetical order by first initial):
JGA: James Green-Armytage


Links (alphabetical by title)

http://www.accuratedemocracy.com
“Accurate Democracy,” by Robert Loring

http://www.econ.vt.edu/tideman/rmt.pdf
“Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The Refinement - Manageability
Trade-Off in the Single Transferable Vote,” by Nicolaus Tideman

http://condorcet.org
by Blake Cretney
http://www.condorcet.org/emr/index.shtml
the Election Methods Resource at Condorcet.org

http://www.fairvote.org 
Center for Voting and Democracy

http://approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting

http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/politics/condorcet.html
“Condorcet's Method,” by Rob Lanphier

http://userfs.cec.wustl.edu/~rhl1/rbvote/
“Ranked ballot voting methods,” by Robert LeGrand

http://www.electionmethods.org
by Mike Ossipoff and Russ Paielli

http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk
Electoral Reform Society

http://electorama.com
Electorama
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com
Election Methods Mailing List Archives

http://www.idea.int/esd/publications.cfm
International Idea Handbook of Electoral Systems Design

http://fc.antioch.edu/~jarmyta@antioch-college.edu/voting.htm
James Green-Armytage’s voting methods page
http://fc.antioch.edu/~jarmyta@antioch-college.edu/voting_methods/survey.htm
Voting Methods Survey by James Green-Armytage

http://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/demexp-dev/2003-09/pdf00000.pdf
“A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method,” by
Markus Schulze

http://www.ericgorr.net/condorcet/
Ranked ballot voting calculator by Eric Gorr

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system
Wikipedia: Voting system

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method
Wikipedia: Condorcet method