[EM] Re: IMHO, IRV superior to Approval

[Adam Tarr]

Chris, your computer clock is off.

Chris Benham wrote:

>Initial two candidate election (with ratings out of ten).
>01: A(9)>>B(1)
>99: B(8)>>A(7)
>
>B wins 99 to 1. Now we add a third candidate X, which all the voters rank 
>adjacently to A, and who
>therfore meets the Blake Cretney definition of a clone of A.
>
>Same voters and initial 2 candidates, but with a third candidate added.
>01:A(9)>>X(2)>B(1)
>99:B(8)>A(7)>>X(1)
>
>A wins 100 to 99. So adding a clone of A, which ALL the voters ranked 
>last, changed A from a
>1/100 loser to the winner."
>
>In reply to this you asked (Sun.Jun.6):
>
>>
>>Why would the B faction vote for A in the second example?  There's nothing
>>"dishonest" about them only voting for B, which is exactly what they
>>should, and almost certainly would, do.
>>
>>
>This is the bit you (and Bill Clark) apparently did't read:
>>
>>For my demonstration, I am assuming that the voters know nothing but 
>>their own sincere ratings
>>of all the candidates on the ballot, and that in that situation they all 
>>use the best "strategy"
>>of approving all the candidates they rate above average, and no others.

This assumption has no basis in real public elections.  The common thread 
in your and James's criticisms are the assumption that the electorate will 
behave in a rather blatantly irrational manner.

Since I've posted a few messages supporting approval lately, I figure I 
should probably mention that while I like approval, I think it could be a 
bit erratic in close elections, and that winning votes Condorcet is my 
favorite single-winner method.  I consider IRV an improvement over 
plurality, but I would rate approval voting as simpler and better.
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