[EM] IMHO, IRV superior to approval

Adam Tarr atarr at purdue.edu
Sun Jun 6 13:16:02 PDT 2004

Chris Benham wrote:

>Initial two candidate election (with ratings out of ten).
>01: A(9)>>B(1)
>99: B(8)>>A(7)
>B wins 99 to 1. Now we add a third candidate X, which all the voters rank 
>adjacently to A, and who
>therfore meets the Blake Cretney definition of a clone of A.
>Same voters and initial 2 candidates, but with a third candidate added.
>A wins 100 to 99. So adding a clone of A, which ALL the voters ranked 
>last, changed A from a 1/100 loser to the winner.

Why would the B faction vote for A in the second example?  There's nothing 
"dishonest" about them only voting for B, which is exactly what they 
should, and almost certainly would, do.

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