[EM] Cumulative Vote equivalence to Plurality

[Ken Johnson]

>Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2004 17:45:49 -0700 (PDT)
>From: Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>...
>No runoff method (or any other sequential elimination method) has simply
>"honest ballot" as optimal strategy:
>
>Suppose that there are three candidates that you honestly rank as A>B>C.
>
>Suppose further, that you are reasonably sure that A could not beat C if A
>survived to the last round, but that B could beat C if B survived to the
>last round.  Then it might be to your advantage to rank A in second (if
>not last) place, contrary to your honest preference order.
>
>Forest
>  
>
Forest,

This is true, but what about zero-info strategy? Could "honest ballot" 
be optimal for zero info? Also, in the more general case, could the 
optimal strategy be to at least give honest relative rankings/ratings 
among those candidataes who you think could possibly win?

Ken Johnson