Bart Ingles bartman at netgate.net
Sun Jan 18 01:45:01 PST 2004

My mistake, Coombs would be equivalent to reversing the ratings and
sequentially eliminating the *plurality* winner.


Chris Benham wrote:
> I response to my posting:
> I propose and reccomend this single-winner  Condorcet  compliant method:
> Plain ranked-ballots, equal preferences and truncation ok.
> 1: Eliminate all candidates who are not members of the Schwartz set.
> 2: If  more than one candidate remains, then based on the symetrically
> completed (SC) and reversed rankings,
> eliminate the candidate picked by the Alternative Vote (aka IRV).
> Repeat steps 1 and 2 until only one candidate (the winner) remains.
> Bart Ingles wrote (Sat.Jan.17,2004)
> "I think that's equivalent to Coombs, which if anything is even more
> vulnerable to burying than Borda.  You might as well use Borda as the
> completion method, since the Borda score can be inferred from the
> pairwise matrix."
> It is not equivalent to Coombs. Here is an Adam Tarr example (with the
> candidates re-named)

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