[EM] Sincere rankings in the methods comparison test

Alex Small asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Sun Jan 4 13:00:03 PST 2004

Bart Ingles said:
> Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
> orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
> two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would give
> results identical to Borda.

I wonder if Donald Saari has ever contemplated this aspect of Approval
Voting:  That it will frequently give similar results to Borda if voter
preferences are more or less evenly distributed, but with 2 big

1)  No need for ranked ballots and new equipment to handle them
2)  It would be immune to the influence of minor candidates, whereas in
Borda there can be an incentive to put the fringe candidates in 2nd, 3rd,
4th, etc. place, while putting your least favorite of the contenders in
last place.


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