[EM] Re: Testing 1 2 3

[Dgamble997 at aol.com]

Bart Ingles wrote:

>But truncation is equivalent to equal last-choice preference for all of
>the methods listed below.

Yes, it is equivalent but expressing an equal preference for two or more 
candidates is generally considered as different to not ranking candidates you 
don't like.

>> A>B means voters rank A first and B second and C not at
>> all.

>How is this different from ranking C last?  In other words, how is A>B
>different from A>B>C?

It isn't and I've never said it was (except in the case of Bucklin). 

>Good strategy requires either cardinal utilities or strategic info, or
>preferably both.  Although I suppose you could assume pure strategy if
>you also assume that each voter knows how all the other will vote.  In
>that case approval should be essentially equivalent to Condorcet.

Please explain further, with 3 candidates Approval strategy comes down to 
either approving one candidate (your first choice) or two ( your first and second 
choice).

>> In strategic voting whether A>B voters approve A or A and B
>> depends on how the voters respond to the information in an opinion
>> poll using strategy A. In non-strategic voting the voters approve all
>> candidates they like and hence A>B voters approve both A and B.

>Again, this last assumption either invalidates the approval results or
>the ranked ballot results (or both).  If you assume that the voters
>truncate all preferences that they wouldn't approve of under approval
>voting, then you are altering the ranked system results.  If, on the
>other hand, you assume that the voters only truncate when they sincerely
>don't have a preference between the truncated candidates, then your
>approval results are invalid.

Any assumptions made in the model are clearly stated in the instructions.

You appear to be criticising the model on a lack of information. I will 
happily send you one if you want.

David Gamble




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