[EM] Testing 1 2 3

Dgamble997 at aol.com Dgamble997 at aol.com
Fri Jan 2 14:24:02 PST 2004

Bart Ingles wrote:

>There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
>this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for the
>A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve only
>A. This would make approval voting equivalent to Borda, at least where
>fully ranked ballots are concerned.    

The model assumes that voters either use a good Approval strategy (Rob Le 
Grand's strategy A) or approve all candidates they rank. The proportion of voters 
using strategic voting and non-strategic voting can be varied.

>Also, I notice that you allow equal last-choice preferences (e.g.
>A>B=C), but not equal first preferences (A=B>C). Doing one but not the
>other would bias the results. But then the only reasonable way to
>handle (A=B>C) for IRV or Plurality would be to assume that half vote
>one way, and half the other.

This is not correct. The model allows truncation but not equal preference. A>
B means voters rank A first and B second and C not at all.In strategic voting 
whether A>B voters approve A or A and B depends on how the voters respond to 
the information in an opinion poll using strategy A. In non-strategic voting 
the voters approve all candidates they like and hence A>B voters approve both A 
and B.

Approval was also problematic to model.

David Gamble


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