[EM] New methods wrap-up

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Jan 6 22:18:02 PST 2004

Yesterday I said that I hadn't checked out automatic candidate withdrawal 
with wv Condorcet. Now I've checked it out and it doesn't improve on wv. It 
just shifts the winner one position around the cycle, losing the special 
advantages of wv. So: Re-abandoning automatic candidate withdrawal.

I gave up trying to find out of NES,  (Nash Equilibrium Selection), first 
suggested by Alex, it seems to me,  meets the majority defensive strategy 
criteria. Finding that out, establishing the properties of the new methods 
such as NES, BBB, DSV, etc. would probably be quite a job (but if you find 
out, let me know).

Most methods don't meet the majorilty defensive strategy criteria, so maybe 
those methods don't.

When the premise conditions of SFC are met, its less-favored candidate can't 
win at Nash equilibrium. If someone else can, that means that the less 
favored candidate can't win in NES. But if there's no Nash equilibrium, the 
method goes to its tiebreaker, and the less favored candidate could win the 
tiebreaker. So showing that the less-favored candidate can't win means 
showing that someone else can win at Nash equilibrium, or else showing that 
the less-favored candidate can't win the tiebreaker.

Of course all the new methods have their own justification. For instance 
there's certainly virtue in an outcome that no one can improve on. But I 
can't very well propose something that I don't know the properties of. And I 
like the majority defensive strategy criteria, which wv has been shown to 

Mike Ossipoff

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