[EM] supermajority

[Steve Eppley]

James G-A asked about supermajority methods.  

> What to do when we want to use a method that offers the benefits
> of Condorcet but where a supermajority requirement is appropriate,
> e.g. where 70% of the electorate should consent to a new course of
> action before the status quo is changed? 
-snip-

I haven't had time to read any of the replies already posted.  
So I'll be brief here, and merely mention a scheme that seems 
reasonable to me: 

   If no alternative "defeats" the status quo alternative 
   pairwise by at least the required supermajority, then 
   the status quo wins.  Else, the winner is the alternative 
   that wins given MAM (or some other good method).  

A few years ago there was a discussion in this maillist about
supermajority methods, and there was concern that the outcome
might not be stable. (In other words, that if the same votes
are tallied again, the result can change.)  But the scheme
described above is stable.

What is "consent?"  To me, the term makes sense only if it's
shorthand for "a preference for some other particular alternative."

--Steve