[EM] Re: Range Voting

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Someone wrote:

eing able to express ratings on a ballot is more expressive than only
being able to express rankings. I think more expressive is a good
thing.

On the back end, we could silently collapse the ratings into rankings
by sorting the candidates, then apply Condorcet, IRV, etc.

  I reply:

Sillently? Secretly? Letting people think they're voting ratings, and then 
counting them as rankings doesn't seem quite right.


You continued:

Straight rating summation is vulnerable to strategic voting. Perhaps in
this study people voted honestly because it obviously didn't matter and
so there was no incentive to vote strategically. In a real election the
stakes would be higher.

  I reply:

   Do you know of a nonprobablilistsic methods that isn't vulnerable to 
strategy, that doesn't sometimes give incentive for strategy? If so, 
congratulations--you've proved Gibbard & Satterthwaite wrong.

  Seriously, all nonprobabilistic methods can have strategy incentive. One 
chooses which  method's strategy incentive one wants. Some methods minimize 
it. For instance, Approval & Range-Voting (also called CR), never give 
anyone any incentive to vote someone over their favorite. No other 
nonprobabilistic method can make that claim.

I also defined WDSC  in my previous post. Approval, CR, and wv Condorcet 
meet it.

  Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________
Don’t just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! 
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/