[EM] Condorcet completed by IRV
James Green-Armytage
jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Thu Dec 2 22:09:06 PST 2004
The topic of this posting is a version of IRV-completed Condorcet that
seems to pass Steve's truncation resistance criteria, aka Mike's strategy
free criteria.
I had proposed something else back in July, involving something I called a
"UMID" set, but I think Chris has shown me that it's not good. So how
about this:
1. Eliminate non-members of the minimal dominant set.
2. Eliminate all candidates who are pairwise-beaten by a full majority
UNLESS this doesn't leave anyone at all.
3. Hold an IRV tally between remaining candidates.
Am I correct in thinking that this meets the criteria mentioned above?
Does this seem like a sensible way to do IRV-completed Condorcet in
general?
my best,
James
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