[EM] ironclad pro-Condorcet argument?

[Rob Lanphier]

James Green-Armytage wrote:

>BASIC STATEMENT:
>	If there is a Condorcet winner with regard to the sincere preference
>rankings of voters, and the voting method is plurality, then the Vote is
>only at equilibrium when the Condorcet winner is selected.
>  
>
If casual observers could understand and believe it, then I think it 
would be.  However, this is a little too abstract for most folks to get 
their heads around (though I like Steve's "arena voting" metaphor).

The most bulletproof argument I know of for Condorcet is: "If there is a 
Condorcet winner with regard to sincere preferences, then the winner of 
a Condorcet election will beat the winner of any election method that 
doesn't choose the same candidate."   In short, the Condorcet winner 
will beat the IRV winner every time.

Rob