[EM] Condorcet methods and weak FBC

[Kevin Venzke]

Hello,

Has it been shown that no Condorcet methods (at least, those we discuss)
meet weak FBC?

I was toying with the idea of a criterion which would go something like
this:

"Suppose X is the sincere favorite of all the voters, and all the voters use 
'optimal' strategy.  Then no matter what any voter believes about how any other 
voters will vote, X must be elected, or be involved in a tie."

I think this criterion would be somewhat weaker than weak FBC, but if no
Condorcet methods meet the latter, than I have less hope that many methods
of this type can be devised.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


	

	
		
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