[EM] Correction [was Re: (no subject)]

[Bart Ingles]

Bart Ingles wrote:
> 
> In theory at least, it is possible under all of these systems for bad
> polling data to induce voters to abandon a majority first choice
> candidate, resulting in a win for some unnecessary compromise.  This may
> sound unlikely when considering a ranked ballot system, but is also
> precisely what is required for an instance of noncompliance under
> Approval.

I should have added "...when relying on polling data".

In the complete absence of polling data, the usual "better than average"
approval strategy assumes that all candidates are equally likely to be
in a tie for first place.  This could of course elect a candidate other
than one ranked first by a majority, but the strategy makes a second
assumption: that the voter is concerned with more than just his
preference order.  In this case non-compliance to a criterion based on
preference order, brought about by voters who override their own
preference order in favor of something else (i.e. cardinal utility),
doesn't seem all that important.

Bart