[EM] direct democracy / proxy system proposal

[Forest Simmons]

It looks like you have thought this through pretty thoroughly.

As you noted, the security of communication would be a major issue, as
well as preservation of anonymity, where that is essential.

It seems like the national scale might be too large at present, but the
idea could be used in state or other more local jurisdictions.  At the
other end, the house of representatives could use the method among its
members, since not all members are always present to vote on each issue.

Also there is a natural hierarchy generated by the method.  At any moment
in time there are proxies, proxies of proxies, proxies of proxies of
proxies, etc.

The further up the hierarchy, the smaller the group, in general.

For routine matters, the vote could be limited to the smaller groups, but
as matters get more interesting, the democracy gets more direct.
This might just happen naturally, or there could be conventions that
encouraged it.


Forest




On Thu, 23 Oct 2003, James Green-Armytage wrote:

> Dear election methods fans,
>
> 	Here is my proposal for a direct democracy system that incorporates a
> proxy system. Please let me know if I am repeating someone else's ideas.
>
> 	Each voter is able to have a standing list of proxies. The list can be
> ranked, although it is unlikely that any entries after the first one or
> two will be important. Voters can change their proxy list at any time, and
> they can also destroy it at any time and leave no substitute.
> 	On a given issue S, each voter has 3 options:
>
> 1. Specifically vote on the issue. (This could include formally
> abstaining.)
> 2. Indicate a specific proxies or ranked list of proxies, other than those
> indicated on their standing list, just for the purpose of their vote on
> issue S.
> 3. Do nothing, in which case their voting power goes in the direction
> indicated by their standing proxy list (assuming that they have such a
> list on file).
>
> 	If a voter specifically votes on the issue, then of course their vote
> registers directly.
> 	If a voter indicates a new proxy list specifically for issue S, the
> effect for that issue is the same as if they had indicated their standing
> proxy list by default. In either case, a proxy list is indicated.
> 	If voter A indicates voter B as his first proxy, and voter B votes
> directly on the issue, then the weight of voter A's vote is added to voter
> B's and cast the same way.
> 	If voter A indicates voter B as his first proxy, voter B indicates voter
> C as her first proxy, and voter C votes directly on the issue, then both A
> and B's vote are cast as C's vote is cast. And so on.
> 	If voter A indicates voter B as his first proxy, and voter B makes no
> indication at all of his vote (that is, doesn't vote on the issue, doesn't
> indicate a proxy for the issue, and doesn't have a standing proxy list),
> then A's vote is transferred to the next proxy on his ranked list, instead
> of to B.
>
> 	A paradox might arise if A indicates B as his first proxy, B indicates C
> as her first proxy, and C indicates A as his first proxy.
> 	One (somewhat arbitrary) rule I have devised to resolve this is as
> follows:
> 	In the above case I would define a path such that A's vote has traveled
> the path A-->B, then the path B-->C, and then the path C-->A.
> 	The rule is that a vote should not travel along the same path twice.
> Hence, once A's vote returns to A, it should not once again move from A to
> B. Instead, it should travel to the next proxy as ranked on A's proxy
> list. The same will go for B and C's votes in this example.
> 	This rule is not especially important, since such paradoxes are not a
> serious concern, and other rules are possible. Still, one must have at
> least some rule to resolve this.
> 	Another possible rule is that a vote shouldn't be assigned to the same
> person twice. Hence in the example above A's vote would be transferred to
> C's next choice, rather than being assigned to A once again.
>
> 	As for the voting method used to decide the actual issue, that is left
> open here. For a single winner issue, I would tend to prefer beatpath or
> ranked pairs. For a multiple winner issue where proportional
> representation is appropriate, I would tend to prefer Meek STV, local
> CPO-STV or CPO-STV. Other methods are possible, though.
>
> 	The reason I think that it would be good to have a proxy system is that
> people will not necessarily have the time to become educated on a given
> issue, but perhaps they know of someone who might, and whose views they
> tend to agree with. And in turn, it is possible that this person won't
> have time to become educated on this particular issue, but knows someone
> who might, and so on.
> 	The reason I think that it would be good to allow people to allow
> different proxies for different issues is that it will enable people to
> indicate people who are knowledgeable in the field that the issue relates
> to. For example, if the issue is relevant to the environment, then the
> voter may indicate an environmentalist, or a staff member of an NGO that
> deals with the environment. Or the voter may just delegate her vote to
> someone whom she knows has educated themselves well about that issue in
> particular. Even though an average voter would not always be able to make
> these distinctions, their proxies and their proxies' proxies might.
>
> 	I do not intend to suggest that such a proxy system would make a
> legislature of elected representatives unnecessary. I think that it would
> serve as a complement rather than a replacement to representative
> government.
> 	Indeed, the official strength / bindingness of such a direct vote is left
> open, that is, whether it creates law in itself, whether it is subject to
> amendments, revisions, vetoes, etc. There might be many situations where
> it is attractive to have such a direct vote, but have it not be legally
> binding. That is, where the public are able to express their opinion
> actively (rather than through the use of randomly sampled polls, etc.),
> but the final decision is left to the traditional structures of
> government.
> 	Actually, this non-binding vote might be the best place to start from, in
> order to build public participation and trust before investing legal power
> in it.
>
> 	Of course, the communication medium that would support this process is a
> difficult problem, which is already under debate. The internet is the
> obvious choice, but then there is the issue of security, that is the worry
> that someone may be able to hack into the system and change the outcome of
> the vote. Also there is the issue of access, that is the fact that not
> everyone has equal access to the internet. However, if such problems are
> ever satisfactorily addressed, I hope that the resulting system of direct
> democracy will look something like the above.
>
> sincerely,
> James Green-Armytage
>
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