[EM] old school MCA issue

[Kevin Venzke]

Here are some messages that might be of interest:

Forest proposes the method (MCA):
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9571
Alex proposes that any number of favorites be permissible:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9582
Forest agrees but expresses doubts:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9628
Joe Weinstein coins "Majority-Choice Approval," supports the unlimited version,
offers some other commentary:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9692
Forest replies to this:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9707

It seems that ever since, we've favored permitting any number of favorites
to be listed, because that permits MCA to meet weak FBC and clone criteria,
like Approval.

Could I interest anyone in reconsidering this point?  It has come to be my
feeling (and it seems to have been an original suspicion) that in realistic
scenarios, there is little or no use for the middle rank, if any number of
candidates may be "preferred."  (I'll spare you the reasoning at this point.)

This would be quite different if only one candidate could be preferred.  We
would have a method where only one candidate could be a majority favorite,
which would be easier to sell, I think.  Forest suggested (back then; maybe
he's changed his mind) that a majority favorite would be rare, anyway.  (I suspect
he is or was right, though: Even in Plurality, a weak third candidate can
prevent anyone from having a majority.)

Who would gain from ranking Compromise as "preferred"?  One who thinks Compromise
could be a majority favorite, and that Compromise is better than the expected
winner by greatest approval.  It's true that such voters could give the election
away to Compromise, but: 1. They'd be likely to do the same thing in an Approval 
election (that is, approve Compromise, believing Favorite is hopeless), and 2. 
Favorite's true approval, at least, would be revealed in the results.

This does not look bad to me.  What do you think?  Does it seem to anyone that
this method would preserve two-party rule?  Is FBC too crucial to fail so clearly?


Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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