[EM] Re: Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand
Rob LeGrand
honky1998 at yahoo.com
Thu Nov 20 16:44:45 PST 2003
David wrote:
> A 380 approve A
> A>B 28 approve AB
> A>C 9 approve AC
>
> B 80 approve B
> B>A 2 approve B
> B>C 133 approve B
>
> C 4 approve C
> C>A 13 approve AC
> C>B 351 approve C
>
> This gives the following result in the Approval election:
>
> A 432 winner
> B 243
> C 377
>
> C is the Condorcet winner but A wins using strategy A under Approval.
>
> Why am I getting different results, am I applying strategy A incorrectly
> or am I using different assumptions to the ones you used?
The short answer is that you're allowing the voters to adjust their votes
only once. With repeated adjustments, the voters would be able to find the
equilibrium
A 380 approve A
A>B 28 approve AB
A>C 9 approve A
B 80 approve B
B>A 2 approve BA
B>C 133 approve BC
C 4 approve C
C>A 13 approve C
C>B 351 approve C
and C would win (A 419, B 243, C 501). This is quite an interesting
example, though. I'll investigate it further and get back to you again.
=====
Rob LeGrand, psephologist
rob at approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting
http://www.approvalvoting.org/
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