[EM] Re: Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

[Rob LeGrand]

David wrote:
> A  380    approve A
> A>B 28   approve AB
> A>C  9    approve AC
>
> B  80      approve B
> B>A 2     approve B
> B>C 133 approve B
>
> C 4          approve C
> C>A 13    approve AC
> C>B 351   approve C
>
> This gives the following result in the Approval election:
>
> A 432  winner
> B 243
> C 377
>
> C is the Condorcet winner but A wins using strategy A under Approval.
>
> Why am I getting different results, am I applying strategy A incorrectly
> or am I using different assumptions to the ones you used?

The short answer is that you're allowing the voters to adjust their votes
only once.  With repeated adjustments, the voters would be able to find the
equilibrium

A   380   approve A
A>B  28   approve AB
A>C   9   approve A
B    80   approve B
B>A   2   approve BA
B>C 133   approve BC
C     4   approve C
C>A  13   approve C
C>B 351   approve C

and C would win (A 419, B 243, C 501).  This is quite an interesting
example, though.  I'll investigate it further and get back to you again.

=====
Rob LeGrand, psephologist
rob at approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting
http://www.approvalvoting.org/

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