[EM] untraceable receipts

[Dave Ketchum]

On Fri, 14 Nov 2003 22:55:33 +0100 David GLAUDE wrote:
 >
 >
 > Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
 >
 >> There's also something to be said for not over-optimizing for the
 >> corner cases.  At least in the vast majority of precincts in the U.S.,
 >> active coercion is quite rare. We should design to avoid the most
 >> common problems, as long as there was some way to address the edge
 >> cases with more effort.
 >
BUT, if coercion is made possible, there are those that will do it.
 >
 > Belgium is not a country where we think the government or a specific
 > party will try to modify the election result to get more power or stay
 > for ever in power. At least not here and now.
 >
 > However if electronic voting become common place, in many years, no-one
 > will care to verify or distrust the system. And at that time, maybe the
 > less democratic party of all will be in power and try to stay there by
 > all mean.
 >
 > Also there is another risk. If Cuba start doing electronic election
 > taking Belgium or the US as an example and mimic it. Then we (democratic
 > country) will have no way to say that the system Cuba use is not 
democratic.

This is a BIG reason for WANTING US products to be good - smaller 
countries cannot afford to do their own thing.
 >
 > Actually Belgium frequently send observer all arround the world (in
 > country where the democracy is weak) in order to verify if everything
 > goes well. But WHO ARE WE to judge the level of democratic election in
 > other country where in our own country it is not possible to recount and
 > only few the happy few expert or worker from the vendor of the e-voting
 > system could control the election result.
 >
 >> Of course, in other countries I imagine it would be quite different.
 >> But I think the more important question is whether we can reach
 >> consensus about -what- information should be available to -whom-.
 >
 >
 > My vote should only be known by me (that is the principle of a secret).
 > I don't even trust the computer in front of me. ;-) (many ATM machine
 > have a "web"-cam for security reason. How long until voting machine have
 > one?

Voting machines have different needs than ATMs - might verify more 
carefully who gets to be a voter, but not proper to peek in on how they vote.
 >
 > Then my vote exactly as I made it should be available (mixed and shaked
 > with other) to the counting team... counted with whitness from each
 > party. Then after the count, keeped securely for potential recount.
 >
 > I think that before any electronic system get introduced, you need to
 > carefull set the goal and define what democratic election are.
 >
 > My definition is:
 > 1) The vote should be secret.

Agreed.

 > 2) The election result should be under citizen control (not expert
 > control) [Where expert are the computer scientist for the state or from
 > the vendor or ...]
 >
 > If a system exclude 99.9% of the population that must trust the other
 > 0.1% able or capable to understand the system, then we have a problem.
 >
Agreed the understanding must be common; details of even good 
implementations go over most of our heads.

 > I had the plan to present a list of computer scientist durring the
 > election. Then if our list get absolute majority... who will trust the
 > result of the election.
 >
 >  > If we can agree on that social question, the technical problems
 > should > be simple to resolve.
 >
 > Trust me it is NOT SIMPLE at all.
 >
 > Securing a system from the user might be easy.
 > Securing a system from the creator/operator of it (and hacker) is way
 > much more difficult.
 > Making such a system transparent as election should be without
 > compromising the secrecy of the vote make it even more difficult.
 >
 > David GLAUDE
-- 
   davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
             Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                   If you want peace, work for justice.