[EM] The 'Turkey' problem and limited ranks

Alex Small asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Sat May 31 11:21:01 PDT 2003


MCA is also more likely to elect A in this scenario.  The A>B>C faction
can safely rate A preferred and B acceptable, unless they believe a
majority of the electorate is rating both B and C as preferred.  So while
MCA is not completely immune to manipulation of polls (is anything?), it's
certainly more robust than some methods.

Also, can somebody remind me what the "Turkey Problem" is?  This thread
has been going on for a while.  I seem to recall it having something to do
with a candidate winning even though a lot of people didn't really like
him that much.

Alex

Forest Simmons said:
> True preferences of voters:
>
> 6000 A>>B>C
> 3000 C>B>>A
> 1000 B>C>>A
>
> Poll results reported by the corporate media backing the corporate
> clones B and C:
>
> 35% A>B>C
> 40% C>B>A
> 25% B>C>A
>
> Under Approval candidate A could easily lose to B if enough A supporters
> are fooled by the fake poll.
>
> See the full text of message 10396 for further analysis showing that
> Borda and IRV are also apt to give B the win in this context, while
> Condorcet and Candidate Proxy are almost sure to elicit more sincere
> votes and give the win to A.






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