[EM] Condorcet corresponding to some variant of IRV
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon May 26 17:52:02 PDT 2003
Chris,
--- Chris Benham <chrisbenham at bigpond.com> a écrit : > Bjarke,
> I have had a closer look at your suggested method and I think it is
> superb. I think the short answers to your questions are yes and yes,but
> no real problem if I am wrong because in that case we can apply the
> method to the Smith set.
I am curious as to why you suspect that Bjarke's method will produce
the Condorcet Winner.
> One of the strengths of IRV is that a voter's lower preferences can
> never harm the prospects of the voter's higher preferences, and I think
> your method shares that quality, or nearly does.
The problem is that your favorite can retake the lead. Your lower
preferences could keep that from happening.
In the method as he described it, there is significant incentive to
raise compromises in attempt to reach a majority first.
> Here is a ticky example someone gave here earlier this year:
> 36: R
> 9: C > R
> 18: C ( > L )
> 18: L > C
> 19: L
> Eighteen C voters are "insincerely truncating", and by most of the
> methods proposed for resolving circular ties, thereby cause C to win
> when otherwise C would have lost. (to me the problem should be put the
> other way round, i.e in the case where those C voters vote sincerely
> there lower prefeerences have caused their favourite to lose.)
> But to employ your method, 1st. round: R : 36 C: 27 L: 37 , 2nd.
> round: R: 45 C: 27 L: 37,
> 3rd. round: R: 45 C: 45
> L: 37 As there are no more preferences to distribute, and as R was
> ahead last round, then I assume that R wins.
Do you think this is a better outcome? Truncating can still help you.
I think that is more obvious with this system than with RP.
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
___________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français !
Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list