[EM] The "Turkey" problem and limited ranks

[Rob Lanphier]

Kevin,

You seem to be making the case that voters shouldn't express their 
preferences between candidates they don't like.  I really disagree with 
this premise.

For example, let's say that among the candidates on the ballot, there's 
a bumbling idiot, and a genocidal maniac.  I want to be able to make 
sure that my preference for the bumbling idiot over the genocidal maniac 
is recorded.

Rob

Kevin Venzke wrote:

>Dave,
>
>The problem with the truncation solution is that it is never in the
>interests of the individual voter to rank two candidates equally
>when he truly does have a preference.  (Ignoring the possibility of 
>cycles for the moment.)  In other words, it is potentially useful
>to vote X>Y while disliking both.
>
>If people did agree to truncate before the bad candidates, the
>winner's average utility would be higher (we would have a guarantee
>that someone thought he was a good choice), but some voters might
>have gotten a better result by not truncating.
>
>Here's an example, as you asked:
>
>48: A>B>C  (A worth 100, B worth 15, C worth 0)
>2: B (B worth 100, A and C worth 0)
>48: C>B>A  (C worth 100, B worth 15, A worth 0)
>
>If they vote as above, B is the CW.  His average utility is only
>16.4, while A and C are both worth 48.  If the A and C supporters
>truncate, A and C tie.  But say there isn't a tie, and one of the
>B supporters votes B>A>C, so that A is the CW.  Now the C supporters
>regret truncating, because they could've at least gotten B elected.
>B is still pretty bad, but he's better than A.
>
>In Approval, unless A or C look hopeless, only the 2 voters will
>approve B.  The other 96 voters are better off trying to break a
>100-15 tie than a 15-0 one.  Thus the average utility of the winner
>is improved by collecting information on preference priorities.
>
> --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit : 
>  
>
>>>The "turkey problem" is the fear that an unknown, or even
>>>universally disliked candidate could be the CW if there are no
>>>candidates with broad support.
>>>      
>>>
>>Seems like an unreasonable fear.
>>
>>I favor permitting and using truncation, but this requires an 
>>understanding that those you do not list must be those you like less than 
>>any you do list.
>>
>>Given the above understanding, a universally disliked candidate will never 
>>get voted better than any other candidate by any voter, and thus have no 
>>chance to become a Condorcet Winner.
>>    
>>
>
>For it to be as you say, the voters have to quite selflessly say, "Although
>I prefer X to Y, I dislike them both, so I'll not stop Y from beating X
>if that's what other voters prefer."
>
>That's a commendable attitude, but Condorcet doesn't reward it.  With
>limited ranks (including Approval), every voter has to make such concessions
>to some extent.  Instead of "I dislike them both" as the thought, it would
>likely be "I can't expect to gain as much from trying to break an X-Y tie."
>
>  
>
>>I can picture listing an unknown candidate before one who threatens to 
>>vote "wrong" on abortion, but i do not see this becoming a problem unless 
>>many of us vote for the unknown - but you are talking of getting in 
>>trouble with Condorcet with a collection of candidates for which Approval 
>>would not have a problem.
>>    
>>
>
>"Unknown" may be too strong.  The candidate may be tight-lipped, poorly
>understood, or not covered well by the media.  It's conceivable that
>voters would prefer to take their chances with him over a candidate they
>know they hate.
>
>  
>
>>How about a sample collection of votes to make the picture clearer.
>>    
>>
>
>
>Kevin Venzke
>stepjak at yahoo.fr
>
>
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