[EM] Re: The "Turkey" problem and limited ranks

[Kevin Venzke]

Forest,

 --- Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit : > 
> It would be nice to have B win in this case because the choice is between
> 55 mildly disappointed voters and 45 devastated voters.
> 
> In this case the cruder resolution would bring victory to B in the zero
> information case, for example.  But in the case of near perfect
> information, the 55 majority would probably (insincerely) demote B to the
> middle category so that the ballots would look like
> 
> 55 A|B...
> 45 B|A...
> 
> allowing A to win after all.

If A and B are the only candidates who appear viable, I'd say this
outcome is guaranteed.

> 
> Is there an antidote to this kind of problem?

I doubt it.  The problem doesn't bother me as much because of my suspicion
(possibly unfounded) that in a Condorcet election, there would on average
be more apparently viable candidates than in a Plurality one.  As the
odds of each candidate being a front-runner become more even, the utility of
each candidate becomes a more important factor in deciding where to
place the dividers.  (I say this based on my present understanding
of Mike Ossipoff's articles on Approval strategy.)

> 
> In the past I have argued that this is an improvement over greater
> resolution methods because at least in the zero information case the
> results are better.
> 
> My main reservation about plain Approval and other low resolution methods
> is a nagging feeling that methods that give better results in the zero
> information case than in the perfect information case can be manipulated
> too much by fake information.
> 
> Can anybody elucidate this?

I think you're right.  But in what situation do you suppose a low-res
method would produce an inferior result to a high-res one?  If there are
only as many viable candidates as ranks in which to put them, it seems
to me that we have nothing less than ordinary Condorcet.  Perhaps "sincere"
voters are getting "cheated" (e.g. they waste a rank), but their sincerity
actually improves the result, it seems.  If there are more viable
candidates than ranks, the voters will have to consider preference
priorities just to be efficient (i.e. even if they don't care about
sincerity).


Yours

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


___________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!? -- Une adresse @yahoo.fr gratuite et en français !
Yahoo! Mail : http://fr.mail.yahoo.com