[EM] Fwd: Is Condorcet The Turkey?

[Bart Ingles]

Kevin Venzke wrote:
> 
>  --- Bart Ingles <bartman at netgate.net> a écrit : >
> >
> > Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > >
> > > Yes, but I think we all still like Condorcet.
> 
> Bart wrote:
> >
> > I'm not crazy about it.  In a ranked election to choose an election
> > system I might rank it above "Irving", but in an approval election I
> > would likely bullet vote for approval voting.
> 
> Sorry for speaking for you (and anyone else).  I was just thinking that,
> within the "turkey" thread, it didn't seem like anyone was actually
> saying Condorcet was bad.

I didn't say it was bad necessarily, I just said I wasn't crazy about
it.  If nothing else, at least it appears to be one of the few systems
(along with Approval) which are free from both Duverger's law and from
catastrophic strategy incentives.  But some of my misgivings are noted
below.


> I take it you prefer Approval because it requires its winners to be overtly
> "approved" on ballots?

That was my original reason, in that Approval appeared to be capable of
dumping very low-utility/low-worth Condorcet winners when the number of
candidates is small.

Other reasons:

(1)  Approval works on existing voting equipment, while Condorcet
requires a computer to tally the ballots.  Translating preference orders
to an N x N matrix is an n-squared operation, which would not be
possible on a public scale without computers.  So even Australia, which
has been using ranked ballots for years, would likely need to retool to
support Condorcet elections.  Manual recounts would be out of the
question (for what that's worth).

(2)  The people I have talked to on this list and elsewhere who have
actually been involved in conducting elections have been pretty adamant
that the system must be simple to administer, participate in, and
understand.

(3)  Strategy concerns, not necessarily catastrophic but enough to
complicate voting.  For example, under Condorcet voters have the ability
to dump a low-utility Condorcet winner using a prisoner's dilemma-based
strategy.  Some of us are quick to discount the possibility of voters
using this type of strategy, but this phenomenon is actually quite
common.  Civil society is built on individuals sacrificing to varying
degrees for the common good.  We willingly forgo certain things without
expecting immediate compensation, because we expect to be compensated in
the "big picture".  Otherwise we'd all be out looting museums.  Or
common courtesy-- take the simple act of holding a door open for a
stranger carrying an armload of packages-- it's not like you expect a
tip.  Rather, you expect to reap the benefits of living in a society
where people hold doors open for strangers with packages.

In any case, whether to pursue this strategy or not is one more decision
voters would have to face, in addition to ranking the candidates.  In
some cases it could be the more difficult decision.

With Approval, the strategy is much simpler: decide where to set your
threshold.  If you are undecided about a candidate who is right on the
threshold, you can always toss a coin (or better yet, focus your
research on that candidate, rather than waste your time on the
"no-brainer" choices).

(4)  One Condorcet strategy situation occurs to me which apparently
does not involve a prisoner's dilemma: when you really do have NO
preference between some of the candidates.  In this case, it seems to
me, you should always rank the indifferent candidates strategically
relative to one another, presumably by burying the one(s) who present
the greatest threat to your favorite.

To expand this a bit, I can imagine a voter presented with a long list
of candidates who ranks the top few sincerely, and then decides he
doesn't care about the rest.  But instead of truncating, the voter
should probably rank these candidate in inverse order of their threat
potential, with any likely Condorcet winners ranked last.

In essence, if you have no preference between two or more candidates you
should never show it sincerely on the ballot (unless they are running
equal in the polls as well).

(5)  I haven't seen much evidence that anything more complicated than
Approval is needed.  For myself, I have yet to participate in an
election where I would have had difficulty voting an Approval ballot.  I
CAN think of elections where ranking all the candidates would have been
difficult, especially when there are many other open seats and ballot
measures to contend with. 

(6)  It would seem to make sense to implement the simpler, cheaper
method first.  Then if something more elaborate and expensive is needed,
implement it only where needed-- probably in larger elections that
attract many candidates.  Elections with only 3 or 4 candidates should
probably remain Approval even if Condorcet equipment becomes available.