[EM] Fwd: Is Condorcet The Turkey?

[Bart Ingles]

Two points in response:

(1) "Irving" has substantially the same problem, as do all ranked voting
systems.  This was the initial reason I became disillusioned with ranked
voting systems.

(2) The whole question becomes moot when the number of candidates who
can actually be competitive in an election is limited to two.  We all
agree that the Plurality system does this by reinforcing the two-party
system (i.e. Duverger's Law), but what Runoff and Instant Runoff
supporters don't seem to grasp is that those systems also reinforce the
two-party system.

For the second point, look to Australia.  In spite of the fact that
proportional representation in the Senate has nurtured a strong
multi-party infrastructure, IRV elections in the lower house continue to
be dominated by two-party elections.  Additional parties may gain more
first-choice votes than they would under the Plurality system-- topping
out in the teens and low twenties rather than single digits as seen in
the U.S.-- but they rarely win elections.

Bart



Dgamble997 at aol.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>     ---------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Subject: Is Condorcet The Turkey?
> Date: Sat, 7 Jun 2003 07:33:35 EDT
> From: Dgamble997 at aol.com
> To: election-methods-list at egroups.com
> 
> Hello List
> 
> Recently there have been a large number of postings regarding
> something called the turkey problem- indifferent/poor candidates
> winning as the least worst choice in a condorcet ballet.
> 
> Due to the nature of the Condorcet method- which considers lower
> preferences before the fate of higher preferences is decided-
> condorcet would appear to me to be a turkey electoral system.
> 
> The fundamental difference as regards the results between condorcet
> and irving is that  condorcet allows the election of candidates of
> candidates with little or no first or higher preference support. It is
> these candidates who are likely to be the turkeys.
> 
> Take the following example:
> 
> Candidate A takes distinct policy positions on a range of issues,
> because of this he gains a great many enthusiastic supporters but also
> a great many vehement opponents.
> 
> Candidate B takes opposing positions to candidate A, because of this
> she also gains many supporters and many opponents.
> 
> Candidate C does nothing, says nothing and offends nobody.
> 
> The votes are cast as follows:
> 
> AC  498
> BC  497
> CA     3
> CB     2
> 
> Under condorcet candidate C as the least objectionable wins.
> 
> It occurs to me that the best way to win a single seat condorcet
> election is to stand on a platform of bland, vague and generalised
> policies that nobody could disagree with or be offended by.
> 
> Politics is fundamentally about disagreement, about different people
> supporting positions and policies that are different to each other and
> often in opposition to each other. Compromise and consensus are good
> things but not at any cost.Condorcet appears as a ' compromise at any
> cost' electoral system. It will elect candidates whose only merit is
> that they offend no-one.
> 
> Irving also elects compromise candidates, however under irving a
> candidate must get a reasonable proportion of first/higher preference
> support to reach next stage of the election and win. A candidate
> cannot win by being everybody's last preference.
> 
> Compromise candidates who attract a reasonable level of higher
> preference support are probably good people to elect. They have said
> or done something to make people positively support them. Compromise
> candidates who attract little or no higher preference support, who
> have said and done nothing and whose sole merit is that they offend
> and upset nobody are probably not good people to elect.
> 
> Irving elects the first type of compromise candidate but not the
> second, condorcet elects both. This is why irving is better than
> condorcet.
> 
> David Gamble