[EM] Combining Condorcet and Approval

[Forest Simmons]

Since I don't like multiple stage elimination methods, but I do like the
other ideas in Chris Benham's suggestion below, I offer the following
adaptation of Chris' ideas:

(1) Use CR ballots with voter inserted approval cutoffs.

(2) Completely carry out the elimination procedure described by Chris
below, but instead of declaring a winner, merely award each candidate
points according to the number of elimination stages survived.

In other words ...

A candidate with more than 50 percent approval gets a point for that fact.

Being in the Smith set relative to this elite group gets him another
point.

Not having least approval within this even more elite group gets him
another point.

etc.

(3) On each ballot calculate a new approval cutoff as the weighted average
of the ballot's candidate ratings, using the points from step (2) above as
the weights.

(4) If this new approval cutoff lands smack on top of a candidate's
rating, move this new cutoff (ever so slightly) into the gap on the side
towards the original voter inserted cutoff.

(5) The approval winner based on the ballots' new approval cutoffs is the
method winner.

[end of description of the method]

This method takes the number of elimination stages survived as a measure
of the viability of a candidate.  Other measures of viability could be
used as the weights [in step (3) above] to create other similar methods.

For example, you could make a variant of Mike Ossipoff's Voters' Choice by
calculating the winners of all of the voters' favorite methods, and then
let the viability weight for a candidate be the number of methods that
make him/her the winner.

Forest


> On Thu, 17 Jul 2003, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> >
> > After much thought, this is my very serious proposal  for the best
> > version of  Approval-completed  Condorcet for public elections.
> > Voters rank the candidates, equal preferences ok. Also voters insert an
> > Approval cutoff, default  is between  1 and 2. (Yes/No option for each
> > candidate is also ok, with default being Yes to all the number ones and
> > No to the rest.)
> > If any candidates are approved by a majority, eliminate the rest. Of
> >  the remaining, elect the CW if there is one. If not,eliminate all non-
> > members of the Smith set and also the Smith set member with the fewest
> > approvals.Of the remaining, elect the CW is there is one.If not then
> > eliminate the remaining candidate with the fewest approvals, and so on.
> > "When the car gets stuck in the mud, make the horse do as little work as
> > it has to to pull the car out. Don't just abandon the car and jump on
> > the horse!"
> > The car in my metaphor represents the Condorcet method, and the horse
> > represents the Approval method.
> > One of the main reasons for the first step (eliminating candidates not
> > approved by a majority)is to get voters to take the Approval cutoff
> > seriously.
> >
> > Chris Benham.
> >