[EM] The "Fresh Egg" winner - beyond Condorcet's pairs

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Jul 5 20:29:02 PDT 2003


 --- Tom Ruen <tomruen at itascacg.com> a écrit : 
> Hi Dave, Adam and others,

Hmmmm.  If I understand what you're saying, you would look at this election:
48 A>B>C
2 B
48 C>B>A

and find that B is inherently not such a great winner?

I don't really think that will work...  It seems that you're using miniature
plurality contests to make the call, and the result (I believe) is that, just
as in plurality, an ideology will be harmed (evaluated as being an inferior winner)
by being represented by too many candidates.

> 1. A Sovereign Majority (SM) - If a candidate exists that is never below first place among any
> subset of competitors. (Also more simply defined If a candidate exists that has more plurality
> votes than all others combined.)

This is the majority criterion, isn't it?

> 2. A Fresh Egg Majority (FEM) - If a candidate exists that is always above last place along all
> subset elections with competitors.

So you're saying (I think) that B does not have an FEM, because in the subset ABC, he
is last.

> If I have a point, it is to suggest that Condorcet may be more negligent than supporters wish to
> admit, and even if everyone agrees that Condorcet picks a best winner, I'd like recognition when
> a pairwise winner is picked without core support of plurality counts.

Hmmm.  It seems to me to be not very useful to gauge "core support" in terms of
plurality counts, as I suggested above.  Additionally because, if a certain voter
votes A>B>C>D>E>F, then for the subset DEF, will you not be counting this ballot 
as a vote for D?  That seems hard to defend.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr

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