[EM] Condorcet completed by Approval Elimination , corrected (was re: Approv

[James Green-Armytage]

Dear Chris,
	What advantage does this system have over, say, ranked pairs Condorcet?
And what is it about Condorcet that makes you think that it's stuck in the
mud?
	Have you evaluated what kind of strategies voters would be likely to use
for their Approval cutoffs, and how those strategies would affect the
Condorcet efficiency of this method?


>After much thought, this is my very serious proposal  for the best 
>version of  Approval-completed  Condorcet for public elections.
>Voters rank the candidates, equal preferences ok. Also voters insert an 
>Approval cutoff, default  is between  1 and 2. (Yes/No option for each 
>candidate is also ok, with default being Yes to all the number ones and 
>No to the rest.)
>If any candidates are approved by a majority, eliminate the rest. Of 
> the remaining, elect the CW if there is one. If not,eliminate all non-
>m
>approvals.Of the remaining, elect the CW is there is one.If not then
>eliminate the remaining candidate with the fewest approvals, and so on. 
>"When the car gets stuck in the mud, make the horse do as little work as 
>it has to to pull the car out. Don't just abandon the car and jump on 
>the horse!"
>The car in my metaphor represents the Condorcet method, and the horse
>represents the Approval method.
>One of the main reasons for the first step (eliminating candidates not
>approved by a majority)is to get voters to take the Approval cutoff
>seriously. 
>
>Chris Benham.