[EM] A few short replies

[Kevin Venzke]

First, I want to clarify that I don't claim Condorcet's "turkey problem" is a
serious issue.  If plain Condorcet were as easy to explain and hand-count as Approval,
I would easily prefer it to plain Approval.

Douglas Gamble wrote:
>Under Condorcet by casting a second preference for compromise candidate 
>B both A and C voters have effectively defeated their first choice and elected 
>B.

I assume you realize that each faction is defeating the OTHER faction's first
choice, not their own.  That detail may not matter to you, but in truth their
lower preference for B is not hurting their own favorite.

James Green-Armytage:

That was a great message.  I agreed with every bit of it.  My only slight difference
of opinion would be that I think single-winner Condorcet/Approval/etc. is still a
good idea for legislatures.  Perhaps a legislature could be mixed PR/single-seat,
but I think that deciding policy with a solely PR-based legislature is as bad as
electing single winners with plurality.

John Hodges wrote:
>Whether IRV is the best method possible is 
>open to debate; but it ain't all THAT bad. C'mon, people.

I think it is comparably bad to plurality, because it still encourages two-party
dominance.  An electoral method that can't even avoid that, in my view, isn't
worth the effort to implement.

You also said:
>Oddly enough, even Condorcet-completion methods cannot be relied on 
>to select the Condorcet winner, once you take into account the 
>incentives for and effects of insincere voting.

Can you clarify this?  As I understand those terms, Condorcet completion methods
are only used when a Condorcet winner doesn't exist.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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