[EM] turkey filters

[James Green-Armytage]

Dear Anthony,
	Although it is well articulated, I disagree with your argument that
Condorcet produces turkey politicians, and I will try to explain why.
	(By the way, hello everybody, I'm new to the mailing list. To be honest I
haven't followed this extremely long turkey thread from the beginning, so
I hope that you all will forgive me if I duplicate something that has
already been said.)

First of all, you write:
>I don’t think it is ridiculous at all, it is in fact a
>probable outcome.
>
>Consider the Australian example.  Ballots are ranked. 
>Equal rankings are not allowed, except that truncation
>sometimes is.  The count is conducted by IRV, not
>Condorcet, but I argue that that is nearly irrelevant
>– the masses are fully occupied , 1st, with decided
>which candidate they will prefer, and 2nd, with
>following the instructions on how to complete their
>ballots.  Few enough understand the mechanics of vote
>counting, let alone analyse it.
>
>
>A typical result is (seen often enough during the
>physical sorting of ballots):
>
>45% left>centrist>right
>5% centrist>left?right
>45% right>centrist<left
>various other candidates randomly interspersed.
>
>The centrist candidate is arguably a turkey who is
>eliminated by IRV but who would win under Condorcet.
>
>The important factor that leads to the above voting
>pattern is not a rational strategy, but the
>psychological urge to put your favourite’s most
>serious opponent *LAST*.  After all, the elector's
>favourite will have been most lengthily denouncing
>that main opponent.  Some other candidate will find
>themselves last an anyone’s ballot only if they are
>seriously repugnant.   

I reply:
	I'd like to respond to the idea that the centrist candidate will be a
turkey, that is someone without any real visions or ideas, someone not
really capable to lead, etc.
	There are many ways to respond to this, but one idea struck me as
interesting: In a real Condorcet election, assuming that anyone really
wants to get elected, it is unlikely that only three candidates will run,
and more specifically, it is unlikely that only one candidate will try to
stake out the center terrain of the political spectrum.
	The assumption of a one-dimensional political spectrum is very
simplifying, but I will go along with that assumption for now because it
makes the kind of analysis we are doing much more manageable!
	So, given a political spectrum, Condorcet clearly favors the center of
that spectrum (as defined not by the parties, but by the median will of
the voters). Given that, it is implausible that in any serious election
only one, mediocre, candidate without much support would aim for the
center territory. Much more likely is that multiple candidates will run on
centrist platforms. Then, the voters will be able to rank which ones they
like best (still ranking their favorite 'wing' party first, if they like).
The winner will still be a centrist compromise candidate, but he will not
be a turkey, because competition among centrist candidates will easily
weed out the incapable and vapid ones, and probably produce a winner who
is relatively capable.
	So, in my opinion the problem with your example whereby the centrist
turkey gets elected isn't a problem with the system, but is rather a
problem with the candidates who are running. Given that, I think that your
idea to raise the threshold to entry into political races is exactly
backwards. As far as I can see, the more candidates who are running means
more intense competition between candidates, which in turn leads to a
higher quality of the eventual outcome. If you made it harder for people
to run, then I think that your chance of people having to choose between
unsatisfactory candidates would only increase.
	Condorcet is a very centripetal method. For single-winner elections,
that's the best possible quality, because one person is supposed to
represent *all* the voters as well as possible, *not* just one half of the
voters or the other. Consider the alternative to centripetal politics: for
example our own two party system. Lets imagine that for the whole 8 years
that Clinton has been in office, a huge amount of Republican voters and
other people on the right were seething with rage. Now, since Bush has
been in office, everyone on the left has been filled with fear and
loathing.
	Really, that is not a good way to exist in a country. Plurality voting
seems to tend toward that kind of divisiveness, and if IRV is bad at
picking compromise candidates, then I imagine that it may tend toward that
as well.
	So I say that the centripetal tendency of Condorcet is one of the best
things about it. However, if you are not excited about a government full
of centrist compromise politicians, then I suggest that the best option
for you is proportional representation. With PR, it's possible to have
politicians who don't necessarily have to have such a broad appeal, but
rather have very strong appeal with a smaller segment of the electorate. I
think that good PR systems can create very lively political scenes which
are quite responsive to the changing will of the electorate, and I love
the idea of PR for just this reason, and I think that multi-person
legislatures should be elected using PR. Although it makes sense to still
use single-winner for president, mayors, etc, and of course even within
legislatures you have to use single-winner systems to decide on policy.
	And for single winner elections, a compromise candidate is the most sane
option available. If one of the 45% wing parties win in your example, then
the other 45% of the voters will be totally screwed, and unrepresented.
However, if a centrist gets elected, especially out of a fairly
competitive pool of centrists, then people from both wings will have had
some input into the process.

	I hope that this has been interesting, and not a total repeat of
something else that has been said. I have plenty more points to recommend
Condorcet from a normative point of view, but I don't want to stray too
far from the point at hand, or write something that is too big for anyone
to respond to.
	Anyway, in the interest of dialogue, thank you for writing in support of
IRV on a list that seems to have a fairly heavy Condorcet presence. Please
let me know if there are lists where Condorcet supporters are more in the
minority (though still listened to), and I will try to look at those.
Although to be honest, it seems like a more-than-full-time occupation to
keep up with all these lists!

all the best,
	James

	
_________________________________

[original message]:

I think the turkey issue is a real problem for
condorcet and approval.  A simple solution is to
filter out the turkeys before they get on the ballot.

 --- Adam Tarr <atarr at purdue.edu> wrote: 
>> 
>> That said, I have argued in both my recent messages
>> that it's pretty 
>> ridiculous to expect a candidate with
>> undifferentiated opinions to get a 
>> vote, even a lower place vote, from nearly the
>> entire electorate.  People 
>> are not so easily duped, especially when the leaders
>> of the political 
>> factions would be advising them to not cast a vote
>> for Mr. anonymous in 
>> these situations.
>> 
>> -Adam
>
I don’t think it is ridiculous at all, it is in fact a
probable outcome.

Consider the Australian example.  Ballots are ranked. 
Equal rankings are not allowed, except that truncation
sometimes is.  The count is conducted by IRV, not
Condorcet, but I argue that that is nearly irrelevant
– the masses are fully occupied , 1st, with decided
which candidate they will prefer, and 2nd, with
following the instructions on how to complete their
ballots.  Few enough understand the mechanics of vote
counting, let alone analyse it.


A typical result is (seen often enough during the
physical sorting of ballots):

45% left>centrist>right
5% centrist>left?right
45% right>centrist<left
various other candidates randomly interspersed.

The centrist candidate is arguably a turkey who is
eliminated by IRV but who would win under Condorcet.

The important factor that leads to the above voting
pattern is not a rational strategy, but the
psychological urge to put your favourite’s most
serious opponent *LAST*.  After all, the elector's
favourite will have been most lengthily denouncing
that main opponent.  Some other candidate will find
themselves last an anyone’s ballot only if they are
seriously repugnant.   


I believe the solution to the turkey problem best
solved by filtering out turkeys before they even get
on the ballot.  A good way to do this is to require a
significant number of nominations to get onto the
ballot.  Perhaps a number somewhere between 1% and 5%
of eligible electors would be appropriate.

Such a turkey filter would have associated benefits. 
The number of candidates would be kept small, and so
the ballot could be kept simple and small.  It would
also be feasible for the media to pay reasonable
attention to every candidate.  It could even happen
that most electors might know who all the candidates
are before reading their names on the ballot!

Anthony


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