[EM] Name that Criterion
Forest Simmons
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Thu Feb 6 12:55:29 PST 2003
It seems reasonable that if S is a ballot set with a definite winner X,
and T is any other ballot set, then sufficiently many copies of S added to
T should result in a ballot set supporting X.
As far as I can tell, all seriously considered deterministic methods
(including IRV and Borda) satisfy this condition.
What should we call it? Here are some ideas:
The Minority Swamping Criterion
The Asymptotic Monotonicity Criterion
The Asymptotic Robustness Criterion
The Irrelevance of Negligible Minorities Criterion
For those who have had a little topology, this condition can be
interpreted as openness of the victory regions in the space of all
possible elections associated with the method.
Why is this condition interesting?
I believe that this condition and the Pareto condition taken together
might be sufficient to rule out the Strong FBC.
To be continued ...
Forest
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