[EM] Name that Criterion

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Thu Feb 6 12:55:29 PST 2003

It seems reasonable that if S is a ballot set with a definite winner X,
and T is any other ballot set, then sufficiently many copies of S added to
T should result in a ballot set supporting X.

As far as I can tell, all seriously considered deterministic methods
(including IRV and Borda) satisfy this condition.

What should we call it? Here are some ideas:

The Minority Swamping Criterion

The Asymptotic Monotonicity Criterion

The Asymptotic Robustness Criterion

The Irrelevance of Negligible Minorities Criterion

For those who have had a little topology, this condition can be
interpreted as openness of the victory regions in the space of all
possible elections associated with the method.

Why is this condition interesting?

I believe that this condition and the Pareto condition taken together
might be sufficient to rule out the Strong FBC.

To be continued ...


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