[EM] IRV in action
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Wed Apr 9 02:35:01 PDT 2003
Dear Dave,
you wrote (9 April 2003):
> Markus wrote (7 April 2003):
> > Example:
> >
> > 40 voters vote X > Y > Z.
> > 35 voters vote Y > Z > X.
> > 25 voters vote Z > Y > X.
> >
> > Candidate Y is the IRV winner.
> >
> > Suppose that candidate Z asks his supporters to bullet vote.
> > Then this example looks as follows:
> >
> > 40 voters vote X > Y > Z.
> > 35 voters vote Y > Z > X.
> > 25 voters vote Z.
> >
> > Now candidate X is the IRV winner. Now candidate Z can hope
> > that some of the supporters of candidate Y will give their
> > first preference to candidate Z to keep candidate X from
> > winning. Then this example looks as follows:
> >
> > 40 voters vote X > Y > Z.
> > 35 voters vote Z > Y > X.
> > 25 voters vote Z.
> >
> > Now candidate Z is the IRV winner.
>
> How did we get here? We started with Z voters liking Y better than X.
> Why would they destroy that via bullet voting?
> How did this ever happen? After the Z voters make sure Y could not win,
> what kind of arm twisting is ever going to get Y voters to help Z win???
Of course, strategical behaviour is something subtle. The party of
candidate Z will say: "Use bullet voting to demonstrate that when Z isn't
elected then it doesn't matter who is elected." This party won't say:
"Use bullet voting to keep Y from winning."
Markus Schulze
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