[EM] Re: Strong FBC, tie-breakers

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Mon Apr 7 10:51:01 PDT 2003

Are you sure that the method  "Have an approval cutoff in the rankings. 
If there is no CW, elect the approval winner" factors "ALL  of the 
strategy away from the rankings or ratings of the candidates"? Might it 
not be possible that a group of voters believes that its  favoured 
candidate is not the CW but might be the Approval winner, and therfore  
might be able to gain by insincerely order-reversing so as create a 
circular tie ?
You wrote: "I'm increasingly fond of the idea of having Condorcet where 
no candidate may win who isn't  a first choice of 20% or so (arbitary 
I dislike arbitary features in general and I hate arbitary thresholds 
especially those not related to the number of candidates. What if you 
have a  "first choice threshold" of 20% , and there are 6 or more 
candidates and NONE of them makes the threshold ?
Any threshold destroys compliance with  the Sure Loser criterion with no 
real compensating advantage that I can see, and so is therefore 
You went on: "The "first-place  mentions"  winner could suffice in the 
absence of a CW too."
Maybe this could be a goer  as a compromise with supporters of 
 Plurality  (and maybe IRV), but otherwise I don't get it..
This is something I could live with :  An approval cutoff in the 
rankings. If no CW, then elect the approval winner from the Smith set. 
Default approval cutoff between first and second.

Chris Benham

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