[EM] IRV in action

[Rob Lanphier]

The idea of Nader being the Condorcet winner is absurd.  While it's true 
that there was some *very limited* common ground between Nader and the 
traditional right wing (some aspects of NAFTA, WTO), the fact of the 
matter is that the vast majority of Bush voters would have either 
truncated or *maybe* ranked Gore above Nader if there was any actual 
threat of Nader winning.

The more realistic three-way Condorcet race from 2000 would have been 
between Bush, McCain and Gore, like so:

Bush>McCain: 49,000,000
McCain>Bush>Gore: 1,000,000
McCain>Gore>Bush: 500,000
Gore>McCain: 49,500,001

McCain might very well have won that contest based on second place 
strength, and I think there would have been a lot of grumbling, but you 
would have had a lot of Bush supporters saying "well, at least Gore 
didn't win", and Gore supporters saying "well, at least Bush didn't 
win".  In essence, a compromise would have been entirely appropriate.

Of course, under IRV using these ballots, Gore wins by one vote.  We all 
know he won by more than that.

Rob

James Gilmour wrote:

>While I accept that IRV would reject some Condorcet winners, I have real concerns
>about the political acceptability of the Condorcet outcome in some (very real)
>circumstances and the effect of the voting system on electors' behaviour.
>
>I have used the popular vote results of a real election, but I've reversed the two
>largest figures to make a point.
>
>Bush	50,996,064
>Gore	50,456,167
>Nader	 2,864,810
>
>Please do not think this is an attack on the electoral college - that is a quite
>separate issue.  I hope no one will be offended by my omission of all the other
>candidates from this exercise.
>
>If this were a popular vote FPTP election, Bush would win.  But if we assume Nader
>supporters are closer to Gore than to Bush, some would say we should use IRV so
>that the majority of voters could be represented.
>
>Now we have to make assumptions (guesses) about how these same voters might vote
>under a different voting system.
>
>IRV1
>Bush		50,996,064
>Gore		50,456,167
>Nader>Gore	 2,864,810
>
>Nader is excluded and Gore wins.  Majority of voters represented.
>
>
>IRV2
>Bush		50,996,064
>Gore>Nader	50,456,167
>Nader>Gore	 2,864,810
>
>As before, Nader is excluded and Gore wins.  Majority of voters represented.
>
>
>IRV3
>Bush>Nader	50,996,064
>Gore>Nader	50,456,167
>Nader>Gore	 2,864,810
>
>As before, Nader is excluded and Gore wins.  Majority of voters represented.
>
>BUT Nader was everyone's second choice and so this is not a properly
>representative result.
>
>Solution = Condorcet.  Result = Nader wins.
>This makes good theoretical sense, which I fully understand, but I do not believe
>it would be politically acceptable to the electors of the USA.
>
>Were Condorcet ever to be adopted, I would predict that you would NEVER see the
>voting pattern given at IRV3.  Once the major parties saw the effect of the
>Condorcet system, their supporters would "bullet vote" only for the parties'
>candidates.  So you would be back to the pattern at IRV1.   The "other side" might
>win, but at least they wouldn't see their own chance denied almost automatically
>in favour of a minor minority candidate.
>
>I think the real world would be very different from the simulations commonly used
>here to show the strengths and weaknesses of different voting systems.  My
>conclusion would be that US electors would accept IRV but not Condorcet.
>
>James
>
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