[EM] Strong FBC, tie-breakers

[Kevin Venzke]

Forest,

I think it can be said that this method (rankings and approval of pairs) isn't clone-proof.  A
major party will want to run two candidates, in attempt to get both into the second stage.  It's
like approval with runoff.

 --- Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit :
> Is there any simpler method that factors all of the strategy away from the
> rankings or ratings of the candidates?

Sure.  Have an approval cutoff in the rankings.  If there is no CW, elect the approval winner.


I'm increasingly fond of the idea of having Condorcet where no candidate may win who isn't a first
choice of 20% or so (arbitrary threshold).  The "first-place mentions" winner could suffice in the
absence of a CW, too.  That would encourage voters to provide more information about which
candidates are acceptable (because we *know* first-place is "approved"), and wouldn't require as
much thought from the voter as placing an approval cutoff would.


Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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