[EM] Re: Strong Favourite Betrayal Criterion at last!

[Forest Simmons]

On Wed, 2 Apr 2003, Alex Small wrote  in part:

> One interesting thing about Approval Runoff is that strategically it
> satisfies the Majority Criterion:  When there is a candidate whom a
> majority of the voters consider their first choice then he should win.
> With adequate polling data, the majority will be aware of one another, and
> they'll approve only their favorite.  He's guaranteed to be one of the top
> 2, and he'll also automatically win the pairwise contest.
>
> One possible downside:  The largest single organized group of voters (not
> necessarily a majority, nor a group that has a common favorite) can
> guarantee a candidate's victory by only approving him and a freak.  If
> their favorite is a serious candidate he'll automatically beat the freak
> in a pairwise contest.
>

That's another good reason to restrict such methods to the Candidate Proxy
context or other applications where communication and coordination are
facilitated.

Forest